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1.	  Introduction	  
This	   paper	   is	   written	   towards	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   ‘Good	   Governance	   in	   terms	   of	  
properly	  managing	  contradictory	  public	  values’	  (as	  is	  the	  title	  of	  the	  relevant	  IRSPM-­‐panel).	  
Its	   underlying	   assumption	   is	   that	   such	   good	   governance	   and	   proper	   management	   are	   at	  
stake	  also	   in	  the	  design	  and	  establishment	  of	  (frameworks	  for)	  organizations	   involved	  with	  
the	  delivery	  of	  public	  services	  (i.e.	  relevant	  to	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole;	  e.g.	  public	  works	  
and	  physical	  infrastructures,	  regulation,	  financial	  support,	  supervision,	  courts).	  	  
With	   a	   focus	   on	   public	   service	   organizations	   (hereafter	   called	   PSO’s)	   of	   a	  hybrid	   kind,	   the	  
notion	  of	  contradictory	  public	  values	  can	  be	  addressed	  in	  a	  constructive	  way,	  useful	  to	  future	  
evaluative	  or	  design	  challenges.	  	  
	  
This	   paper	   purports	   that	   what	   is	   ‘Good	   Governance,	   in	   managing	   contradictory	   public	  
values’,	  depends	  strongly	  on	   the	   relevant	  distinctive	   governance	  context	  and	   the	  ability	   to	  
properly	   align	   basic	   organization	   characteristics,	   such	   as	   of	   PSO’s,	   to	   these	   contexts	   -­‐	  
applying	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘contradictory	  values’	  in	  function	  of	  ‘alignment’.	  
	  
This	   focus	   and	   indeed	   the	   overall	   approach	   in	   this	   paper	   can	   best	   be	   described	   as	   ‘legal-­‐
administrative’,	  as	  it	  seeks	  to	  analyze	  the	  issue	  of	  alignment,	  of	  contradictory	  public	  values	  
and	   of	   hybrid	   PSO’s	   from	   a	   perspective	   which	   builds	   upon	   legal	   concepts	   of	   and	   legal	  
analysis	  within	  public	  administration.	  	  
	  
This	   paper	   is	   written	   ‘in	   one	   go’.	   It	   next	   addresses:	   types	   of	   values	   and	   interests	   (§2),	  
institutional	  environments	  (§3),	  	  di-­‐	  and	  trichotomies	  in	  value	  configurations	  (§4),	  alignment	  
between	   environments	   and	   organizations	   (§5),	   non-­‐exclusiveness	   of	   alignment	   (§6),	  
hybridity	  of	  organizations	  (§7),	  good	  governance	  (§8),	  management	  (§9),	  good	  governance	  &	  
proper	  management	  (§10),	  conclusions	  (§11).	  	  
	  
	  
2.	  Interests	  &	  values	  
As	  the	  adjective	  in	  public	  services	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  indicative	  of	  an	  interest	  of	  the	  ‘community	  
as	  a	  whole’	  (see	  §	  1),	  clarification	  is	  required	  of	  both	  the	  public-­‐private	  divide	  and,	  given	  how	  
values	  feature	  in	  this	  paper’s	  title,	  of	  the	  interest-­‐value	  relationship.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  interest-­‐value	  relationship,	  values	  are	  seen	  as	  normative	  concerns	  (e.g.	  qualities	  and	  
standards)	  with	  relevance	  in	  ‘the	  choice	  of	  action’	  (Van	  der	  Wal	  et	  al.	  2006).	  As	  such	  values	  
particularly	  relate	  to	  (actions	  related	  to)	  the	  pursuit	  of	  interests.	  Interests	  I	  define	  as	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perceptions	  of	  states	  of	  affairs,	  or	  of	  assets	  or	  resources,	  considered	  useful	  and/or	  beneficial	  
to	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  certain	  needs.2	  To	  interests,	  values	  bear	  normative	  relevance	  as	  they	  
provide	  criteria	  and	  guidelines	  to	  (the	  ex	  ante	  choice	  or	  ex	  post	  evaluation	  of	  action	  
concerning)	  their	  acknowledgement,	  prioritization	  and	  effectuation.	  Take,	  for	  example,	  the	  
value	  of	  equality	  being	  functional	  to	  serving	  the	  interest	  especially	  of	  those	  who	  may	  
otherwise	  be	  relatively	  deprived	  in	  meeting	  some	  of	  their	  needs.3	  
	  
As	  to	  their	  normative	  nature,	  the	  public-­‐private	  divide	  may	  be	  helpful	  to	  a	  substantive	  
understanding	  of	  both	  interests	  and	  values.	  Let	  us	  first	  look	  at	  (public-­‐private)	  interests	  and	  
then	  to	  (public-­‐private)	  values.	  
	  
Interests	  	  
Concerning	  (public-­‐private)	  interests,	  I	  go	  by	  the	  pragmatic	  approach	  of	  the	  Dutch	  Scientific	  
Council	  for	  Government	  (WRR,	  2000).	  Firstly,	  we	  may	  separate	  private	  or,	  rather,	  personal	  
interests	  (as	  interests	  of	  particular	  individuals	  –	  of	  a	  personal	  nature;	  not	  commonly	  shared)	  
from	  societal	  interests	  (as	  interests	  relevant	  to	  all,	  or	  almost	  all,	  or,	  in	  any	  case,	  to	  society	  as	  
a	  whole).45Next,	  within	  societal	  interests	  the	  Council	  singles	  out	  those	  interests,	  which	  are	  
also	  public	  interests,	  as	  government	  has	  decided	  that	  they	  are	  not	  served	  well	  without	  
government	  intervention.6	  	  
	  
This	  paper	  is	  primarily	  about	  societal	  interests	  –	  such	  as	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  public	  services.	  
Such	  services	  are	  named	  ‘public’	  if	  and	  when	  government	  has	  expressed	  that	  it	  will	  have	  a	  
stake	  in	  the	  (safeguarding	  of)	  allocation	  of	  these	  services.7	  Usually	  public	  services	  are	  related	  
to	  specific	  societal	  interests,	  which	  concern	  broadly	  shared	  needs	  (e.g.	  in	  energy,	  health	  
care,	  food).	  	  
Beyond	  such	  specific	  interests	  there	  lie	  general	  societal	  interests,	  which	  relate	  to	  the	  need	  
for	  a	  ‘functional	  society’	  as	  such	  –	  broadly	  shared	  among	  (past,	  present	  and	  future)	  people	  in	  
living	  in	  some	  form	  of	  ‘togetherness’	  (e.g.	  territorially	  and	  culturally;	  as	  a	  ‘nation’)	  –	  such	  as	  
by	  the	  collective	  desire	  for	  peace	  &	  safety,	  wealth	  &	  sustainability,	  community	  &	  culture,	  
freedom	  &	  justice.	  In	  a	  cross-­‐cutting	  way,	  such	  general	  societal	  interests	  have	  relevance	  to	  
the	  pursuit	  of	  specific	  societal	  interests;	  they	  contribute	  to	  a	  weighing	  of	  interests	  (e.g.	  with	  
scarce	  resources	  which	  specific	  interest	  should	  come	  first),	  but	  also	  to	  dominance	  of	  values	  
with	  regard	  to	  decisions	  taken	  towards	  certain	  specific	  interests	  (e.g.	  equality	  or	  solidarity	  
requiring	  equal	  access	  to	  services,	  above	  highest	  efficiency	  in	  service	  delivery).	  
General	  societal	  interests	  may	  also,	  by	  themselves,	  be	  considered	  by	  government	  as	  (meta-­‐)	  
public	  interests,	  to	  secure	  a	  basic	  societal	  infra	  structure,	  such	  as	  on	  basic	  legal	  
arrangements	  	  (e.g.	  contract	  and	  property	  law;	  a	  system	  of	  government	  –	  amongst	  which	  
courts	  and	  police	  enforcement).8	  
	  
The	  above	  approach	  suggests	  an	  interest	  dichotomy,	  placing	  personal	  against	  societal	  
interests.	  As	  such	  this	  does	  not	  explicitly	  address	  public	  interests,	  as	  these	  are	  merely	  a	  
subcategory	  of	  societal	  interests.	  A	  public	  versus	  private	  dichotomy	  makes	  more	  sense	  in	  
case	  we	  want	  to	  separate	  personal	  interests	  and	  non-­‐public	  societal	  interests	  as	  private,	  as	  a	  
matter	  of	  private	  persons	  initiatives,	  from	  public	  as	  public	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  government	  
involvement.	  In	  doing	  so,	  however,	  we	  must	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  private	  persons	  may	  be	  
actively	  involved	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  public	  interests,	  especially	  by	  delivering	  public	  services,	  
either	  because	  they	  spontaneously	  choose	  to	  do	  so	  (as	  a	  matter	  of	  business	  or	  voluntarism),	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Societal	   Interests	  relevant	  to	  all,	  or	  almost	  all,	  or,	  in	  any	  case,	  to	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  
Public	   Societal	  interests	  which	  are/have	  become	  a	  concern	  for	  government	   Public	  
	  
Values	  
On	  (public-­‐private)	  values,	  the	  above	  functional	  interest-­‐value	  relationship	  suggests	  that	  
societal	  interests	  have	  societal	  values	  as	  their	  correlatives,	  expressing	  normative	  concerns	  
about	  the	  acknowledgement,	  prioritization	  and	  effectuation	  of	  (general	  and	  specific)	  societal	  
interests.	  Such	  societal	  values	  may	  range	  from	  ‘private	  initiative’,	  to	  ‘solidarity’,	  to	  ‘equality’	  
and	  to	  ‘sustainability’;	  dependent	  upon	  the	  normative	  appreciation	  of	  what	  may	  be	  regarded	  
as	  the	  ‘societal	  good’	  (that	  is,	  generally	  considered,	  for	  society	  as	  a	  whole)	  involved	  in	  the	  
pursuit	  of	  particular	  societal	  interests.	  Again,	  one	  may	  ask	  what	  categorization	  makes	  most	  
sense:	  putting	  personal	  versus	  societal	  or	  private	  against	  public.	  Given	  this	  panel’s	  focus	  on	  
contradictory	  public	  values,	  the	  latter	  seems	  most	  in	  place.	  	  
	  
3.	  Institutional	  environments	  
This	  paper	  takes	  the	  viewpoint	  that	  in	  societal	  practice	  we	  find	  that	  there	  are	  patterns	  of	  
social	  (inter)action,	  which	  operate	  as	  institutionalized	  interest-­‐value	  combinations,	  with	  
relevance	  to	  serving	  societal/public	  interests	  (towards	  fulfillment	  of	  societal	  needs).	  	  
These	  (inter)action	  patterns	  and	  interest/value	  combinations	  function	  as	  institutional	  
environments,	  accepted	  in	  society	  as	  useful	  frameworks	  of	  social	  (inter)action	  relevant	  to	  
services	  beneficial	  to	  (specific	  and	  general)	  societal	  interests.	  	  
	  
As	  basic	  patterns	  of	  interaction	  (including	  social	  control)	  each	  environment	  has	  its	  own	  
modes	  of	  governance	  as	  characteristic	  pattern	  of	  behavior	  by	  which	  ‘players’	  (try	  to)	  
influence	  each	  other’s	  behavior	  to	  achieve	  a	  desired	  outcome	  in	  terms	  of	  (ways	  of)	  allocation	  
of	  goods,	  services,	  assets,	  resources,	  rights	  and	  obligations.	  	  
It	  is	  within	  these	  environments	  and	  with	  these	  modes	  of	  governance	  that	  PSO’s	  operate	  –	  
such	  as	  (in)	  hierarchy	  (i.e.	  as	  a	  public	  office,	  operating	  through	  unilateral	  acts,	  for	  the	  public	  
interest,	  according	  to	  public	  values),	  markets	  (i.e.	  as	  a	  company,	  operating	  trough	  
competitive	  bargaining,	  for	  private	  interests,	  according	  to	  trade	  values)	  or	  (in)	  civil	  networks	  
(i.e.	  as	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  service,	  operating	  through	  consensual	  acts,	  for	  a	  community	  interest,	  
according	  to	  societal	  values)	  (References	  to	  be	  added).	  	  
	  
The	  image	  of	  institutional	  environments	  is	  a	  theoretical	  or	  ideal	  type	  understanding	  of	  
institutional	  systems	  of	  interactions	  typical	  to	  the	  allocation	  of	  (in	  short)	  particular	  goods	  
and	  services.	  In	  reality	  these	  environments	  do	  not	  present	  themselves	  as	  pure	  and	  distinct	  
areas,	  also	  because,	  as	  a	  rule	  interactions	  coincide	  or	  are	  intertwined	  with	  other	  interactions	  
of	  a	  different	  environmental	  nature	  –	  such	  as	  unilateral	  government	  acts	  which	  follow	  up	  on	  
a	  multilateral	  contract	  between	  the	  same	  players	  on	  the	  realization	  of	  an	  infrastructure	  
project.	  Still,	  the	  concept	  of	  institutional	  environments	  does	  offer	  useful	  basis	  for	  
understanding	  how	  interests	  and	  values	  are	  related	  and	  translated	  across	  societal	  





Societal	  acceptance	  of	  these	  environments	  is	  especially	  a	  matter	  of	  accepting	  a	  particular	  
mode	  of	  governance	  regarding	  the	  allocation	  of	  particular	  services,	  which	  are	  considered	  
relevant	  to	  certain	  societal	  interests.	  	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  concerning	  more	  general	  interests,	  one	  can	  imagine	  that	  societal	  
acceptance	  is	  of	  a	  more	  abstract	  nature,	  such	  as	  the	  ‘belief’	  that	  markets	  are	  especially	  
beneficial	  to	  wealth,	  that	  civil	  networks	  especially	  promote	  culture	  and	  that	  through	  
hierarchy,	  government	  can	  especially	  safeguard	  peace.	  	  
In	  liberal	  states,	  governments	  often	  consider	  it	  a	  (meta-­‐)public	  interest9	  	  to	  ensure	  that	  each	  
of	  the	  named	  environments	  (especially	  markets	  and	  civil	  society	  networks)	  functions	  
properly	  –	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  society.10	  Thus	  government	  can	  be	  involved	  to	  establish	  
competition	  law	  (to	  improve	  the	  workings	  of	  markets),	  legal	  regimes	  for	  societal	  enterprises	  
(to	  improve	  the	  workings	  of	  civil	  networks)	  and	  judicial	  review	  (to	  –	  indirectly	  –	  improve	  the	  
workings	  of	  government)	  –	  regardless	  of	  specific	  kinds	  of	  services,	  goods	  or	  works	  involved	  
and	  without	  suggesting	  that	  improvements	  by	  government	  must	  come	  with	  active	  
government	  involvement.11	  
	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  specific	  societal	  interests	  may	  come	  with	  a	  spontaneous	  selection	  (over	  
time,	  by	  mere	  factual	  interaction)	  or	  a	  conscious	  choice	  (by	  decision,	  mostly	  of	  government)	  
of	  a	  particular	  institutional	  environment,	  considered	  most	  useful	  (e.g.	  for	  energy	  supply,	  
telecommunication,	  health	  care	  etc.).	  	  Many	  of	  the	  privatization/liberalization	  and	  
publicization/nationalization	  debates	  relate	  to	  such	  conscious	  choice	  (either	  or	  not	  after	  
spontaneous	  selection	  of	  an	  environment	  which,	  after	  some	  time,	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  meet	  
with	  sufficient	  societal	  acceptance).	  	  
	  
Societal	  value	  dimensions	  
Societal	  acceptance	  of	  governance	  in	  these	  environments	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  accepting	  (or	  
rejecting)	  interest-­‐value	  combinations	  regarding	  their	  basic	  patterns	  and	  modes	  of	  
interaction.	  As	  such	  acceptance	  is	  about	  whether	  both	  ‘game	  play’	  and	  ‘game	  results’	  
adequately	  address	  societal	  needs	  –	  needs	  as	  expressed	  in	  the	  societal	  interest	  in	  the	  object	  
of	  allocation	  (specific	  or	  general;	  e.g.	  housing	  or	  justice),	  related	  to	  societal	  values	  (as	  
guidelines	  and	  criteria	  which	  are	  generally	  and	  abstractly12	  considered	  relevant	  to	  this	  
interest).	  	  
	  
As	  a	  matter	  of	  governance,	  these	  values	  address	  various	  aspects	  of	  interaction	  (influencing)	  
and	  allocation	  (achievement).	  From	  a	  legal-­‐administration	  viewpoint,	  these	  societal	  value-­‐
aspects	  (or	  dimensions)	  of	  governance	  are:13	  legitimacy	  (‘Who	  can	  influence	  what?’),14	  
justice	  (‘How	  shall	  or	  may	  influence	  be	  exerted?’),	  effectiveness	  (‘What	  can	  be	  achieved?’)	  
and	  efficiency	  (‘Achievement	  at	  what	  cost?’).	  	  	  
	  
Each	  type	  of	  institutional	  environment	  builds	  upon	  and	  (as	  it	  evolves)15	  expresses	  a	  
characteristic	  configuration	  of	  public	  values,	  with	  each	  aspect	  or	  dimension	  being	  relevant.	  	  
	  
Taken	  separately	  these	  categories	  encompass	  various	  values:	  	  
• Legitimacy	  may	  call	  for	  democratic	  authority,	  or	  for	  agreement	  and	  fair	  trade,	  or	  for	  
inclusion	  and	  consensus.	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• Justice	  may	  require	  a	  statutory	  underpinning	  for	  limitation	  of	  freedom,	  adherence	  to	  
principles	  of	  legal	  certainty,	  equality,	  proportionality,	  and	  bona	  fides,	  as	  matters	  of	  legal	  
validity,	  as	  well	  as	  access	  to	  courts.	  	  
• Effectiveness	  may	  call	  for	  proper	  setting	  of	  goals	  and	  objectives,	  coherence	  and	  
timeliness,	  information,	  customer	  or	  interest/program	  directedness,	  weighing	  and	  
comparing	  (utilitarianism),	  research	  or	  evidence	  based	  action,	  reliability	  (quality	  
management),	  and	  evaluation.	  	  
• Efficiency	  may	  require	  proper	  management,	  maximizing	  benefit	  while	  minimizing	  
burden,	  Pareto	  optimality	  (or	  Hicks	  Caldor),	  general	  moderation,	  and	  cost-­‐benefit	  
analysis.16	  	  
	  
Dimensions	  of	  societal	  values	  in	  governance	  
Legitimacy	   ‘Who	  can	  influence	  what?	  
Justice	   How	  shall	  or	  may	  influence	  be	  exerted?	  
Effectiveness	   What	  can	  be	  achieved?	  
Efficiency	   Achievement	  at	  what	  cost?	  
	  
With	  values	  taken	  together	  as	  configuration	  (with	  assumed	  systemic	  coherence),	  each	  
institutional	  environment	  not	  also	  exists	  factually,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  a	  pattern	  of	  interaction,	  but	  
also	  normatively,	  with	  concern	  for	  a	  particular	  societal	  interest.	  The	  latter	  concern	  is	  carried	  
forth	  by	  a	  value-­‐configuration	  from	  within	  and	  across	  the	  above	  value	  dimensions,	  which	  (as	  
expression	  of	  needs,	  priorities	  and	  trade-­‐offs)	  are	  considered	  to	  encapsulate	  the	  (at	  least	  
most	  relevant)	  aspects	  of	  societal	  acceptance.	  As	  a	  rough	  example	  one	  may	  regard	  the	  
configuration	  of	  democratic	  legitimacy,	  legality	  as	  minimum	  validity,	  public	  interests	  as	  goals	  
of	  effectiveness	  and	  Pareto	  efficiency,	  as	  expressive	  of	  the	  basic	  traditional	  environment	  of	  
western	  hierarchy,	  which	  may	  find	  sufficient	  societal	  acceptance	  when	  applied	  to	  securing	  
and	  fostering	  the	  interest	  of	  wealth	  and	  sustainability.	  
	  
4.	  Dichotomy	  or	  trichotomy	  
Although	  in	  the	  above,	  we	  held	  on	  to	  a	  dichotomy	  of	  interests	  and	  of	  values,	  clearly	  the	  
above	  approach	  of	  modes	  of	  governance	  in	  types	  of	  particular	  institutional	  environments	  (of	  
hierarchies,	  networks	  and	  markets)	  presents	  us	  with	  a	  trichotomy,	  of	  distinctive	  value-­‐
configurations,	  each	  characteristic	  to	  a	  particular	  environment.	  
	  
Hierarchy	  &	  Government	  
In	  that	  respect	  the	  public-­‐private	  value-­‐dichotomy	  makes	  sense	  only	  when	  intended	  to	  single	  
out	  ‘government	  involvement’	  (following	  hierarchy),	  as	  opposed	  to	  ‘non-­‐government	  
involvement’,	  i.e.	  the	  private	  undertakings	  in	  civil	  networks	  and	  markets.17	  There	  may	  be	  
proper	  reasons	  to	  do	  so,	  considering	  the	  extraordinary	  character	  of	  government	  	  –	  both	  in	  a	  
liberal	  and	  in	  a	  collective	  state	  perspective;	  albeit	  for	  quite	  different	  reasons.	  	  
Certainly,	  the	  notion	  of	  (government	  being	  exclusively	  bestowed	  with)	  public	  authority	  
(whether	  statutory	  or	  property	  based),18	  which	  is	  the	  backbone	  of	  (hierarchical,	  i.e.)	  
unilaterally	  binding	  interventions	  in	  society,	  comes	  with	  and	  calls	  for	  a	  configuration	  of	  
public	  values,	  relevant	  to	  the	  (meta-­‐)public	  interest	  pursued.	  	  
In	  taking	  this	  approach,	  we	  are	  excluding	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  ‘private	  authority’	  concept	  of	  
hierarchy.	  Such	  an	  approach	  is	  typical	  of	  the	  Neo	  Institutional	  Economics	  analysis	  of	  ‘firms’	  
as	  hierarchical	  organizations	  useful	  to	  escape	  from	  transaction	  costs	  of	  the	  alternative	  
(uncertain,	  frequent	  and	  asset	  specific)	  market	  transactions	  (Williamson:	  1975).	  The	  
perspective	  of	  the	  firm,	  however,	  is	  treated	  here	  (in	  §	  5)	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  organization	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within	  an	  institutional	  environment	  (i.c.	  the	  market).	  Alternatively,	  private	  authority	  as	  
hierarchy	  could	  be	  conceptualized	  around	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  private	  regulation	  –	  especially	  
by	  major	  firms	  (B2B	  and	  B2C),	  as	  well	  as	  through	  NGO’s	  (such	  as	  certification).	  For	  now	  these	  
practices	  are	  considered	  as	  types	  of	  interactions	  within	  ‘private’	  institutional	  environments:	  
markets	  and	  civil	  networks.	  Hierarchy	  remains	  categorized	  as	  an	  exclusively	  ‘public’	  
institutional	  environment,	  in	  which	  governments	  operate	  as	  unilateral	  actors	  ‘opposite’	  and	  
‘in	  service’	  to	  citizens.	  
	  
Private	  involvement	  
As	  institutional	  environments,	  markets	  and	  civil	  networks	  are	  (similar	  to	  hierarchy)	  in	  need	  
of	  societal	  acceptance	  (and	  represent	  and	  project	  societal	  interests	  and	  values).	  Clearly	  
though,	  their	  success	  is	  largely	  dependent	  upon	  individual	  citizens’	  (including	  businesses	  and	  
NGO’s)	  willingness	  to	  engage	  in	  interactions	  of	  the	  patterns	  types	  typical	  of	  these	  
environments,	  following	  their	  own	  interests	  and	  values.	  On	  aggregate,	  these	  individual	  
interests	  and	  values,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  particular	  mission	  or	  strategy	  of	  a	  particular	  commercial	  
enterprise	  or	  NGO,	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  aiming	  to	  make	  a	  profit	  or	  service	  to	  a	  community,	  
and	  so	  as	  societal	  interests	  with	  accompanying	  values	  (as	  they	  are	  shared	  by	  many).	  Still,	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  societal	  acceptance	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  (‘passive’)	  matter	  of	  a	  
broadly	  shared	  opinion	  that	  environment	  functions	  well,	  but	  also	  a	  matter	  of	  private	  
individuals	  (especially	  organizations)	  being	  willing	  to	  actively	  pursue	  their	  own	  private	  
interests	  within	  these	  environments	  (such	  as	  Philips	  corporation’s	  desire	  to	  make	  a	  profit	  on	  
the	  electronics	  devices	  market,	  or	  Greenpeace	  engaging	  in	  pursuing	  its	  sustainability	  mission	  
through	  civil	  networks).19	  
	  
In	  the	  naïve	  view	  on	  markets,20	  there	  are	  –	  ideally	  –	  only	  private	  players,	  acting	  upon	  their	  
own	  interests.	  Still,	  even	  in	  such	  a	  case	  the	  aggregate	  pattern	  of	  interactions	  and	  their	  
outcomes	  is	  a	  matter	  that	  will	  be	  evaluated	  in	  terms	  of	  societal	  interests	  and	  accompanying	  
values,	  for	  instance	  in	  the	  face	  of	  negative	  externalities	  or	  distributive	  injustice.	  	  
	  
As	  a	  matter	  of	  private	  choice,	  private	  interests	  and	  values	  may	  be	  congruent	  with	  public	  
interests	  and	  values.	  Corporate	  social	  responsibility	  and	  the	  mission	  statements	  of	  NGO’s	  
may	  well	  amount	  to	  a	  public	  interest	  overlap.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  competitiveness	  as	  a	  value	  
need	  not	  only	  be	  of	  a	  private	  nature,	  regarded	  as	  a	  proper	  guideline	  of	  action	  towards	  
fostering	  the	  private	  interests	  of	  market	  parties	  (both	  at	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  side	  of	  the	  
game).	  It	  can	  also	  be	  seen,	  for	  example,	  as	  a	  relevant	  guideline	  to	  public	  authorities	  involved	  
in	  securing	  proper	  energy,	  health	  and	  transport	  services,	  or	  enhancing	  innovation	  and	  
economic	  growth;	  all	  of	  these	  as	  matters	  of	  (meta-­‐)public	  interest.21	  
Clearly,	  in	  this	  day	  and	  age	  of	  governance	  as	  governing	  without	  government	  (see	  §	  3),	  on	  the	  
level	  of	  organizations	  we	  witness	  a	  blurring	  of	  boundaries	  between	  public	  and	  private	  realms	  
of	  interests	  and	  values.	  Through	  privatization	  and	  private	  regulation	  the	  reciprocal	  
exclusivity	  of	  public	  and	  private	  values	  is	  more	  open	  to	  debate	  than	  before	  and	  involvement	  
of	  private	  organizations	  in	  matters	  of	  societal	  interest	  which	  are	  also	  labeled,	  by	  
government,	  as	  public	  interests,	  is	  more	  explicit	  than	  (perhaps)	  ever.	  Still,	  although	  there	  
may	  be	  overlaps,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  definition	  public	  interests	  and	  values	  are	  typical	  to	  
government-­‐hierarchy	  because	  only	  government	  holds	  an	  exclusive	  prerogative	  to	  legally	  act	  
unilaterally	  upon	  such	  interest	  and	  only	  government	  is	  under	  duty	  to	  act	  and	  act	  only	  in	  





The	  perspective	  of	  private	  organizations	  (acting	  upon	  private	  interests	  and	  values),	  next	  to	  	  
government	  (exclusively	  pursuing	  public	  interests	  according	  to	  public	  values),	  leads	  to	  the	  
perspective	  of	  ‘players’	  within	  institutional	  environments.	  As	  organizations	  they	  perform	  the	  
interactions	  that	  shape	  the	  patterns	  that	  environments	  are	  made	  off.	  Hence,	  apart	  from	  
societal	  acceptance	  of	  institutional	  environments,	  we	  must	  look	  at	  the	  level	  of	  organizations	  
operating	  within	  these	  environments,	  and	  how	  their	  interests	  and	  values	  relate	  to	  those	  
upon	  the	  environment	  level.22	  
	  
Indeed,	  organizations,	  such	  as	  PSO’s,	  also	  carry	  with	  them	  an	  institutional	  character,	  as	  they	  
claim	  to	  exist	  as	  entities	  (similar	  to	  natural	  persons),	  guided	  by	  a	  purpose	  and	  projecting	  a	  
particular	  behavior	  pattern	  (with	  accompanying	  social	  structures,	  mechanisms	  and	  processes	  
of	  interaction),	  as	  in	  employer-­‐employee	  and	  management-­‐operation	  relations.	  If,	  however,	  
they	  want	  to	  interact	  with	  or	  impact	  upon	  behavior	  of	  other	  entities	  (natural	  or	  legal	  
persons),	  then	  their	  institutional	  set-­‐up	  must	  somehow	  fit	  with	  one	  or	  more	  given	  public	  
values	  as	  enshrined	  within	  institutional	  environments.	  After	  all,	  their	  functioning	  and	  success	  
as	  organizations	  is	  dependent	  on	  their	  acknowledgement	  as	  players	  in	  the	  (aforementioned)	  
institutional	  environment,	  which	  facilitates	  only	  specific	  kinds	  of	  interactions	  and	  impacts.	  	  
	  
In	  short:	  designing	  or	  establishing	  PSO’s	  requires	  that	  acknowledgement	  is	  ensured	  by	  
sufficiently	  aligning	  the	  organization	  to	  (requirements	  and	  constraints	  typical	  of)	  an	  
institutional	  environment	  (albeit	  not	  necessarily	  with	  exclusive	  specificity	  –	  see	  below).	  
	  
Framing	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  of	  societal	  values	  
(e.g.	  hierarchy,	  markets,	  networks)	  
Institutional	  entities	  
‘claim	  to	  existence’	  
(e.g.	  PSO’s)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  →	  accepted	  frameworks	  ←	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  →	  alignment	  by	  acknowledgement	  ←	  	  
	  
Acknowledgement	  
Acknowledgement	  of	  PSO’s	  by	  an	  institutional	  environment	  (as	  accepted	  in	  society)	  rests	  
upon	  alignment	  between	  the	  environment’s	  characteristic	  value-­‐configuration	  (across	  all	  
four	  value-­‐dimensions)	  and	  a	  PSO’s	  basic	  characteristics	  relevant	  to	  their	  social	  position	  and	  
mode	  of	  interacting	  with	  others.	  	  
	  
In	  as	  much	  as	  institutional	  environments	  are	  ‘ideal	  type’	  models	  of	  societal	  reality,	  we	  can	  
model	  ideal	  type	  organizations,	  which	  are	  in	  optimal	  alignment	  with	  their	  environment.	  
Whether	  such	  ideal	  type	  organizations	  actually	  exist	  in	  practice	  is	  another	  matter,	  but	  their	  
‘model’	  can	  provide	  a	  touchstone	  for	  determining	  discrepancies	  in	  alignment	  (De	  Ridder,	  
2010:	  4-­‐9)	  
	  
We	  can	  model	  organizations	  as	  institutional	  entities	  configured	  by	  the	  following	  key	  
organization	  characteristics;	  crucial	  to	  their	  alignment:	  
• Personality	  –	  each	  organization	  should	  be	  shaped	  as	  entity	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  act,	  
through	  collective	  decision	  making,	  both	  internally	  and	  externally,	  otherwise	  it	  will	  not	  
meet	  with	  recognition	  nor	  have	  acknowledged	  capacity	  to	  act.	  This	  means	  that	  three	  
types	  of	  legal	  conditions	  must	  be	  met	  (Ruiter:	  2001,	  102):	  a.	  conditions	  that	  allow	  for	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decision	  making	  within	  the	  organization	  (e.g.	  organs	  within	  the	  organization	  –	  also	  
regarding	  stakeholder	  involvement);	  b.	  conditions	  that	  allow	  the	  organization	  to	  
influence	  behavior	  of	  others	  (e.g.	  legal	  powers,	  especially	  concerning	  legal	  acts);	  c.	  
conditions	  that	  allow	  others	  to	  impact	  upon	  the	  organization	  (e.g.	  liability-­‐rules,	  
especially	  concerning	  the	  organization	  versus	  its	  stakeholders	  and	  managers).	  	  
These	  key	  characteristics	  seem	  crucial	  (only)	  as	  a	  general	  prerequisite	  to	  alignment,	  as	  
without	  legal	  form	  an	  entity	  has	  no	  basis	  for	  recognition	  in	  any	  environment.	  An	  ideal	  
type	  match	  to	  a	  particular	  environment	  follows	  only	  upon	  the	  next	  characteristics,	  which	  
in	  turn	  will	  reflect	  upon	  how	  some	  of	  the	  three	  above	  types	  of	  conditions	  are	  arranged;	  
• Mission	  –	  organizations	  have	  a	  particular	  ‘raison	  d’être’	  as	  a	  task,	  an	  objective	  or	  a	  
leading	  strategy,	  which	  present	  needs	  that	  underpin	  an	  organizations	  own	  interest	  in	  
certain	  states	  of	  affairs.	  An	  ideal	  type	  taxonomy	  which	  would	  relate	  certain	  types	  of	  
missions	  to	  particular	  environments	  could	  read	  as	  follows:	  a.	  a	  public	  task	  organization	  
(to	  a	  government	  environment;	  e.g.	  of	  a	  private	  foundation	  or	  a	  public	  office);	  b.	  a	  
private	  profit	  organization	  (to	  a	  market	  environment;	  e.g.	  a	  business	  corporation);	  c.	  a	  
community-­‐service	  organization	  (to	  a	  civil	  network	  environment	  –	  voluntary	  or	  
professional;	  e.g.	  housing	  corporations,	  schools,	  trade	  unions).	  	  
• Control	  –	  an	  existing	  organization’s	  operations	  will	  depend	  on	  which	  agents	  determine	  
the	  organization’s	  course	  of	  action	  by	  decision	  making	  from	  within.	  In	  an	  ideal	  type	  line-­‐
up	  the	  following	  control	  types	  feature:	  a.	  public	  authority	  –in	  a	  government	  
environment;	  b.	  investors(’	  agents)	  –	  in	  a	  market	  environment;	  c.	  (expert)	  professionals	  –	  
in	  a	  network	  environment.	  
• Response	  –	  similarly	  an	  existing	  organization’s	  operations	  will	  depend	  on	  to	  which	  
incentives,	  as	  opportunities	  arising	  from	  events	  or	  states	  of	  affairs,	  it	  will	  particularly	  
respond	  (given	  the	  organization’s	  mission	  and	  related	  interests).	  An	  ideal	  type	  line-­‐up	  
features	  three	  types	  of	  responsiveness:	  a.	  public	  good	  (i.e.	  politico-­‐legal)	  incentives	  –	  in	  a	  
government	  environment;	  b.	  competitive	  (advantage/efficiency)	  incentives	  –	  in	  a	  market	  
environment;	  c.	  member’s/community	  incentives	  –	  in	  a	  network	  environment.	  
	  
We	  should	  be	  aware	  that	  under	  institutional	  legal	  theory	  a	  distinction	  between	  three	  types	  
of	  legal	  persons	  is	  made	  (Ruiter:	  2004):	  a.	  associations	  –	  i.e.	  personified	  alliances,	  where	  
original	  long-­‐term	  contractual	  relations	  are	  transformed	  (by	  ‘personification’)	  into	  collective	  
decision	  making	  and	  members;	  b.	  corporations	  –	  i.e.	  a	  personified	  partnerships,	  where	  joint	  
ownership	  of	  one	  or	  more	  objects	  and/or	  capital	  goods,	  are	  transformed	  (again	  by	  
‘personification’)	  into	  collective	  decision	  making	  and	  shareholders;	  c.	  foundations	  –	  i.e.	  
personified	  funds,	  where	  ownership	  of	  a	  collection	  of	  assets	  devoted	  to	  a	  specific	  objective	  
is	  transformed	  (by	  ‘personification’)	  into	  collective	  decision	  making	  and	  an	  objective	  
purpose.	  
Relevant	  as	  these	  distinctions	  are	  to	  the	  choice	  of	  legal	  personality	  form,	  they	  do	  not	  
exclusively	  correspond	  with	  the	  ideal	  type	  organizations	  of	  hierarchies,	  markets	  and	  civil	  
networks.	  	  The	  closest	  fit	  is	  between	  corporations	  and	  the	  market.	  As	  to	  associations	  and	  
foundations	  we	  find	  that	  they	  may	  both	  operate	  both	  in	  hierarchical	  or	  network	  
environments	  and	  so	  both	  with	  public	  or	  private	  missions	  and	  interests.	  As	  all	  can	  be	  used	  
either	  in	  a	  public	  or	  a	  private	  interest-­‐value	  context	  –	  neither	  do	  the	  distinct	  forms	  
exclusively	  match	  with	  public	  or	  to	  private	  organizations;	  	  all	  can	  be	  used	  either	  in	  a	  public	  or	  
a	  private	  context.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  we	  want	  to	  know	  about	  the	  measure	  of	  alignment	  with	  
institutional	  environments,	  have	  to	  look	  through	  the	  legal	  typology	  and	  especially	  check	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mission,	  control	  and	  response.	  Once	  these	  have	  been	  consistently	  and	  properly	  translated	  
into	  a	  fitting	  legal	  form	  (at	  which	  there	  is	  some	  measure	  of	  discretion),23	  then	  organizations	  
are	  indeed	  worthy	  of	  acknowledgement	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  capacity	  to	  act	  and	  success	  in	  
interactions	  fit	  to	  the	  desired	  allocation.	  
	  
Organization	  characteristics	  
Characteristic	   Description	   Aspects	  
Personality	   Form	   decide	  &	  act	  (internal	  +	  external)	  
Mission	   Raison	  d’être	   public	  task	  ;	  private	  profit	  ;	  comm.service	  
Control	   Decision	  power	   public	  authority;	  investors;	  professionals	  
Response	   Incentives	  	   public	  good;	  competition;	  community	  
	  
Friction	  free	  
Ideal	  type	  organizations	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  optimal	  (or	  ‘friction	  free’)	  balanced	  
materialization	  of	  configured	  organization	  characteristics.	  Translated	  in	  their	  correlative	  
organizational	  values,	  they	  provide	  the	  ideal	  match	  with	  a	  particular	  characteristic	  
configuration	  of	  societal	  values	  underlying	  an	  institutional	  environment	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  
legitimacy,	  justice,	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency.	  	  
	  
‘Friction	  free’	  denotes	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  where	  an	  organization	  may	  operate	  without	  issues	  of	  
legitimacy,	  justice,	  effectiveness	  or	  efficiency	  –	  regarding	  personality,	  mission,	  control	  or	  
response.	  Such	  issues	  will	  arise,	  as	  problems	  of	  societal	  acceptance,	  when	  compliance	  (by	  
alignment)	  with	  the	  accepted	  value-­‐configuration	  of	  the	  particular	  environment	  is	  in	  
question.	  When,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  competitive	  bid,	  investors	  in	  a	  business	  corporation	  are	  
given	  a	  major	  say	  in	  the	  realization	  of	  certain	  public	  (infrastructure)	  works,	  issues	  may	  rise	  
concerning	  legitimacy	  and	  justice,	  as	  the	  accepted	  view	  may	  be	  that	  only	  not	  for	  profit	  
organizations	  may	  decide	  and	  only	  on	  a	  statutory	  basis.	  However,	  this	  example	  also	  shows,	  
that	  although	  there	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  an	  ideal	  type	  fit,	  this	  sort	  of	  hybrid	  arrangement	  
(i.e.	  ‘a	  market	  organization	  involved	  in	  government	  affairs’)	  is	  not	  unusual,	  perhaps	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  ad	  hoc	  practical	  value	  trade-­‐offs	  there	  is	  a	  way	  to	  succumb	  ideal	  type	  issues	  (e.g.	  
legitimacy	  deficiency	  compensated	  by	  efficiency	  gains	  –	  or	  efficiency	  gains	  feeding	  into	  a	  
reset	  from	  input	  to	  output	  legitimacy).	  
	  	  
For	  organizations,	  such	  as	  PSOs,	  proper	  acknowledgement	  (as	  alignment)	  may	  be	  
understood	  both	  ontologically	  (concerning	  the	  ‘if’,	  or	  ‘id	  quod’)	  and	  normatively	  (concerning	  
the	  ‘how’,	  or	  modus	  quo’),	  although	  in	  practice	  these	  are	  not	  always	  easily	  discernable.	  
	  
Ontologically	  (‘if’)	  we	  are	  looking	  at	  whether	  alignment	  is	  achieved	  so	  that	  the	  (public	  value	  
configuration	  of	  an)	  institutional	  environment	  indeed	  facilitates	  the	  (possible)	  existence	  and	  
capacity	  to	  (inter)act	  on	  behalf	  of	  its	  own	  interests	  and	  with	  external	  effect	  (as	  social	  or	  
societal	  impact).	  
From	  a	  normative	  perspective	  (‘how’),	  we	  look	  at	  the	  criteria	  which	  follow	  from	  (public	  value	  
configurations	  of)	  institutional	  environments,	  relevant	  to	  evaluate	  the	  success	  (as	  in	  positive	  
appreciation)	  in	  interacting	  and	  causation	  of	  effects,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  balance	  
between	  societal	  and	  players	  interests.24	  	  	  
	  

















The	  relationship	  between	  environment	  and	  organization	  as	  two	  ‘institutional	  levels’	  can	  be	  
understood	  through	  the	  analogy	  of	  the	  organization	  as	  the	  ‘organism’	  and	  the	  environment	  
as,	  the	  ‘habitat’	  –	  as	  a	  comparison	  of	  institutional	  and	  empirical	  alignment.25	  	  
Putting	  it	  plain	  and	  simple,	  if	  we	  compare	  birds,	  humans	  and	  fish	  and	  relate	  them,	  as	  types	  
of	  organisms,	  to	  air,	  land	  and	  water,	  as	  types	  of	  habitats,	  we	  can	  move	  from	  ontological	  
requirements	  to	  normative	  criteria	  of	  success.	  Air,	  land	  and	  water	  come	  with	  their	  own	  
typical	  conditions	  for	  survival,	  which	  can	  be	  summarized	  in	  the	  abstract,	  such	  as	  ability	  to	  
energize	  (breathing	  drinking,	  eating),	  to	  overcome	  danger	  (predators;	  natural	  events),	  to	  
procreate,	  and	  to	  develop	  (grow,	  adapt,	  learn).	  These	  are	  conditions	  analogous	  to	  the	  public	  
values	  of	  legitimacy,	  justice,	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency.	  Conditions	  can	  apply	  to	  organisms	  
as	  ‘conditio	  sine	  qua	  non’	  (with	  ‘ontological’	  relevance)	  :	  if	  an	  organism	  does	  not	  meet	  with	  
these	  requirements	  it	  will	  die	  –	  as	  fish	  on	  land.	  Otherwise	  meeting	  conditions	  can	  be	  a	  
(‘normative’)	  matter	  of	  organisms	  being	  more	  or	  less	  successful	  (organisms	  living	  relatively	  
free	  of	  fear).	  	  
	  
6.	  Non-­‐exclusiveness	  and	  relative	  opposition	  
The	  organism-­‐habitat	  analogy	  may	  also	  serve	  to	  show	  that,	  outside	  ideal	  type	  matches,	  the	  
alignment	  between	  an	  organization,	  such	  as	  a	  PSO,	  and	  an	  institutional	  environment	  is	  not	  
necessarily	  exclusive.	  Compare	  how	  some	  organisms	  manage	  in	  more	  than	  one	  habitat,	  such	  
as	  amphibians,	  by	  sufficiently	  meeting	  requirements	  of	  different	  natural	  environments	  
(although	  perhaps	  with	  the	  need	  to	  regularly	  alternate).	  Two	  (complementary)	  explanations	  
may	  be	  in	  play:	  the	  versatility	  of	  the	  organism	  (as	  in	  combining	  different	  life	  support	  
systems)	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  habitats	  sharing	  similar	  conditions	  with	  importance	  to	  survival	  
and	  success,	  such	  as	  oxygen	  and	  vegetation.	  
	  	  
Plural	  alignment	  
Similarly	  some	  organizations	  will	  have	  a	  fit	  with	  several	  institutional	  environments.	  Private	  
law	  organizations,	  may	  operate	  both	  in	  networks	  and	  in	  markets,	  and	  sometimes	  even	  in	  
public	  law,	  as	  a	  private	  law	  legal	  personality	  of	  an	  administrative	  office.	  Many	  public	  
authorities	  also	  have	  capabilities	  in	  the	  private	  law	  field	  –	  to	  buy	  computers,	  transfer	  land	  
etc.	  Not	  all	  organizations	  can	  align	  ‘plurally’,	  such	  as,	  for	  instance,	  a	  general	  election	  
committee	  without	  legal	  personality;	  locked	  within	  ‘hierarchy’.26	  	  
	  
Apart	  from	  versatility	  of	  organizations,	  the	  possibility	  of	  plural	  alignment	  can	  result	  from	  the	  
fact	  that	  institutional	  environments	  share	  certain	  values	  –	  such	  as	  legal	  certainty	  or	  good	  
faith;	  possibly	  with	  slight	  variations	  in	  interpretation.	  In	  other	  words,	  underlying	  societal	  
values	  (of	  various	  categories)	  may	  be	  ‘environment	  neutral’	  and	  accepted	  in	  all	  three	  
environments	  (e.g.	  reliability)	  or	  two	  out	  of	  three	  (e.g.	  consensuality	  or	  reciprocity	  in	  
markets	  and	  networks	  –	  and	  not	  in	  hierarchy).	  The	  above	  public-­‐private	  dichotomy	  suggests	  
that	  shared	  values	  will	  be	  found	  mainly	  between	  civil	  networks	  and	  markets	  (as	  the	  private	  
realm	  opposite	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  government	  as	  the	  public	  realm),	  but	  the	  core	  interests	  
involved	  in	  networks	  and	  hierarchy	  may	  also	  show	  shared	  values	  (e.g.	  representation).	  
	  
Versatility	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  hybridity	  (more	  on	  which	  in	  the	  below).	  Versatility	  
does	  not	  involve	  that	  the	  organization	  carries	  inconsistencies	  in	  its	  characteristics,	  but	  rather	  
11	  
	  




The	  possibility	  of	  particular	  values	  being	  shared	  by	  all	  or	  two	  out	  of	  three	  environments	  
implies	  that,	  although	  particular	  values	  may	  be	  contradictory,	  value-­‐configurations	  as	  such	  
(i.e.	  institutional	  environments)	  cannot.	  The	  mere	  existence	  of	  three	  main	  types	  of	  
institutional	  environments	  –	  hierarchies,	  networks,	  markets	  –	  rules	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  full	  
contradictoriness	  between	  them.	  Logically,	  it	  cannot	  be	  that	  on	  all	  values	  that	  one	  
environment	  holds	  the	  others	  will	  hold	  opposite	  positions,	  as	  then	  this	  contradiction	  would	  
not	  in	  turn	  fully	  apply	  to	  a	  comparison	  between	  these	  others.	  So,	  the	  fullest	  contrast	  would	  
be	  partial	  opposition,	  with	  one	  of	  three	  not	  holding	  any	  position	  on	  the	  value	  that	  is	  
oppositely	  addressed	  by	  the	  others	  –	  i.e.	  it	  would	  be	  indifferent	  to	  this	  value.	  Further	  than	  
that,	  opposition	  is	  only	  possible	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  mere	  difference	  in	  configuration.	  The	  below	  
table	  shows	  a	  formal	  example	  of	  possible	  oppositions,	  demonstrating	  this	  point.	  	  
	  
Opposition	  of	  institutionalized	  values	  
Value	   Instit.	  Env.→	   Environment	  1	   Environment	  2	   Environment	  3	  
A	   +	   -­‐	   O	  
B	   +	   -­‐	   O	  
C	   +	   -­‐	   +	  
D	   -­‐	   -­‐	   +	  
Only	  considering	  A,	  B	  and	  C,	  environments	  1	  and	  2	  are	  in	  full	  contradiction.	  Environment	  3	  could	  not	  be	  in	  full	  contradiction	  with	  2,	  as	  
then	  it	  would	  be	  equal	  to	  1.	  Taking	  all	  values	  (A-­‐D),	  all	  environments	  do	  share	  one	  value	  (D),	  but	  	  
	  
One	  should	  consider	  that	  contradictions	  are	  relations	  depicting	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  where	  two	  
opposite	  elements,	  such	  as	  values,	  cannot	  be	  the	  case	  at	  one	  and	  the	  same	  instance,	  but	  one	  
of	  them	  must	  be	  the	  case	  (e.g.	  car	  lights	  shall	  be	  on;	  car	  lights	  may	  be	  left	  out).	  Contrary	  
relations,	  however,	  involve	  two	  elements	  that	  cannot	  be	  the	  case	  at	  one	  and	  the	  same	  time,	  
but	  it	  may	  be	  that	  none	  of	  both	  is	  the	  case	  (e.g.	  car	  lights	  shall	  be	  on	  or	  shall	  not	  be	  on;	  
leaving	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  car	  lights	  may	  (not)	  be	  on).	  	  
	  
Trade-­‐offs	  &	  hybridity	  
From	  this	  we	  see	  that	  with	  three	  institutional	  environments	  there	  will	  be,	  comparing	  
configurations	  as	  such,	  contrary	  issues	  only,	  with	  the	  possibility	  only	  of	  partial	  contradictions	  
between	  separate	  values	  included	  in	  each	  specific	  configuration.	  Each	  environment	  may,	  by	  
itself,	  present	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  societal	  value-­‐categories	  and	  values	  (e.g.	  placing	  
efficiency	  before	  legitimacy;	  equality	  before	  freedom).	  Amongst	  each	  other,	  environments	  
may	  share	  some	  values	  (e.g.	  voluntarism)	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  contradicting	  on	  others	  
(e.g.	  cooperating	  versus	  competing).	  Consequently,	  certain	  player-­‐interaction	  combinations	  
will	  be	  prohibited	  –	  cooperating	  between	  competitors	  as	  in	  a	  cartel	  –	  whereas	  others	  will	  
pose	  no	  problem	  –	  ditto,	  to	  jointly	  sponsor	  the	  ‘fight’	  against	  HIV.	  Prohibited	  player-­‐
interaction	  combinations	  disrupt	  an	  organization’s	  alignment	  with	  (one	  of)	  its	  
environment(s).	  Cartel-­‐cooperation	  does	  not	  befit	  a	  corporation	  in	  a	  competitive	  
environment,	  private	  profit	  does	  not	  befit	  a	  government	  under	  hierarchy,	  and	  unilateral	  
power	  does	  not	  befit	  a	  community	  organization	  within	  a	  network	  environment.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand	  exercising	  administrative	  competences	  by	  (competitive)	  corporations	  may	  be	  
considered	  acceptable	  if	  by	  governance	  or	  management	  the	  corporation	  can	  safeguard	  that	  
contradictory	  values	  (e.g.	  private	  profit	  vs.	  public	  task)	  will	  not	  infringe	  on	  its	  interactions	  




7.	  Hybridity	  elaborated	  
The	  relative	  opposition	  of	  institutional	  environments	  facilitates	  plural	  alignment	  without	  
organizational	  versatility	  amounting	  to	  a	  state	  of	  organizational	  hybridity	  in	  which	  key	  
organizational	  characteristics	  are	  no	  longer	  consistent.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  we	  see	  that	  certain	  
player-­‐interaction	  combinations	  	  create	  inconsistencies,	  which	  amount	  to	  hybridity	  as	  a	  
departure	  from	  the	  image	  of	  ideal	  type	  organizations	  –	  fit	  to	  their	  own	  ‘home	  environment’	  
(De	  Ridder,	  2010:	  4-­‐9;	  	  Heldeweg,	  2010:	  58-­‐59).	  Some	  inconsistencies	  may	  be	  remedied	  by	  
organization	  governance	  or	  management,	  others	  may	  not;	  some	  hybrids	  can	  be	  (made)	  
acceptable,	  others	  cannot	  –	  quite	  apart	  from	  changes	  in	  basic	  values	  and	  ‘rules	  of	  the	  game’	  
characteristic	  to	  a	  particular	  environment	  (e.g.	  concerning	  fair	  trade).	  
	  
Types	  of	  hybridity	  
Before	  we	  consider	  possible	  remedies	  (in	  §	  10),	  the	  concept	  of	  hybridity	  of	  organizations	  
should	  be	  clarified	  further.	  To	  this	  end	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  separate	  singular	  from	  multiple	  
hybridity	  (De	  Ridder,	  2010:	  9).	  	  
Organizations	  are	  singularly	  hybrid	  when	  they	  combine	  different	  (ideal	  type)	  modes	  of	  one	  
characteristic.	  On	  the	  characteristic	  of	  ‘mission’,	  a	  for-­‐profit	  organization	  may	  decide	  to	  not	  
only	  aim	  for	  its	  (highest)	  ‘private	  profit’,	  but	  to	  also	  provide	  free	  community	  services,	  and	  
similarly,	  a	  public	  office	  may	  decide	  to	  combine	  the	  pursuit	  of	  the	  public	  tasks	  with	  offering	  
commercial	  services	  for	  profit.	  On	  the	  matter	  of	  ‘control’,	  an	  organization	  with	  shareholders	  
may	  evolve	  to	  be	  fully	  controlled	  by	  professionals	  (as	  managers),	  or	  private	  investors	  may	  be	  
given	  a	  full	  and	  exclusive	  say	  in	  the	  use	  of	  some	  administrator’s	  competences.	  Clearly,	  these	  
are	  combinations	  that	  may	  raise	  issues	  of	  alignment	  (and	  indeed	  of	  societal	  acceptance).	  
Organizations	  are	  multiply	  hybrid	  when	  they	  inconsistently	  configure	  characteristics	  of	  
different	  types.	  For	  example,	  mission	  and	  control	  clash	  when	  an	  organization	  in	  service	  of	  a	  
public	  task	  is	  under	  control	  of	  private	  investors.	  Alternatively,	  response	  and	  mission	  clash	  
when,	  for	  example,	  a	  community	  service	  organization	  seeks	  to	  compete	  with	  similar	  
organizations	  (e.g.	  competition	  between	  schools).	  
	  
Of	  course,	  logically,	  singular	  hybridity	  leads	  to	  multiple	  hybridity,	  as	  the	  ambivalence	  in	  one	  
characteristic	  amounts	  to	  (at	  least)	  a	  partial	  inconsistency	  with	  both	  other	  characteristics.	  
Take	  the	  example	  of	  a	  government	  office	  which	  has	  an	  ideal	  type	  fit	  on	  all	  (‘hierarchy’)	  
characteristics,	  apart	  from	  there	  also	  being	  the	  mission	  of	  making	  a	  ‘private	  profit’	  (to	  the	  
benefit	  of	  a	  select	  group	  of	  investors,	  workers,	  taxpayers	  etc.).	  Clearly,	  this	  profit	  mission	  is	  
inconsistent	  with	  the	  ‘hierarchy’	  substantiation	  of	  control	  and	  response	  (i.e.	  as	  public	  
authority	  and	  public	  good)	  –	  thus	  amounting,	  also,	  to	  multiple	  hybridity.	  
	  
In	  both	  types	  of	  hybridity,	  organizations	  themselves	  will	  be	  challenged.	  A	  singular	  di-­‐	  or	  
trichotomy	  (i.e.	  within	  one	  characteristic	  –	  mission,	  control	  or	  responsiveness)	  may	  by	  
comparison	  be	  the	  least	  of	  worries:	  partial	  multiple	  hybridity	  can	  be	  overcome	  if	  the	  other	  
characteristics	  are	  unambivalent.	  When,	  for	  example,	  public	  tasks	  and	  private	  profit	  are	  the	  
dual	  mission,	  control	  by	  investors	  (or	  their	  agents)	  and	  responsiveness	  to	  competitive	  
advantage,	  may	  provide	  proper	  guidance	  on	  the	  importance	  or	  meaning	  of	  the	  public	  task	  
mission.	  A	  di-­‐	  or	  trichotomy	  across	  characteristics	  (i.e.	  mission	  and/or	  control	  and/or	  
responsiveness)	  may,	  however,	  put	  an	  organization	  well	  out	  of	  balance,	  with	  each	  
characteristic	  pulling	  the	  organization	  into	  a	  different	  ideal	  type	  orientation.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	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managing	  the	  different	  organizational	  value-­‐orientations,	  which	  underpin	  each	  choice	  of	  
characteristic	  substance,	  clearly	  some	  hybrids	  will	  be	  beyond	  striking	  a	  workable	  balance.	  
	  	  
If	  and	  in	  as	  much	  as	  a	  hybrid	  organization	  ‘manages’	  to	  internally	  overcome	  its	  inherent	  
inconsistencies,	  this	  still	  leaves	  the	  issue	  if	  and	  how	  its	  hybrid	  functioning	  will	  align	  with	  one	  
or	  more	  institutional	  environments,	  and	  if	  so,	  whether	  the	  extend	  to	  which	  it	  does	  poses	  a	  
threats	  to	  the	  environment’s	  proper	  workings	  and/or	  societal	  acceptance.	  	  
When,	  for	  example,	  a	  commercial	  business	  becomes	  the	  tax	  collector	  in	  a	  certain	  area,	  the	  
question	  may	  rise	  whether	  its	  performance	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  values	  typical	  to	  hierarchy	  and	  
if	  society	  will	  retain	  faith	  in	  the	  value	  safeguards	  that	  this	  environment	  is	  presumed	  to	  
uphold	  (e.g.	  impartiality,	  equality,	  carefulness).	  Unless	  hybridity	  is	  managed	  as	  plural	  
alignment	  (with	  the	  organization	  effectively	  dividing	  itself	  in	  different	  identities	  –	  e.g.	  within	  
a	  business	  corporation	  one	  separate	  unit	  is	  responsible	  for	  public	  law	  inspections	  or	  
certification),	  hybridity	  presents	  an	  environment	  with	  anomalies	  as	  organization	  values	  do	  
not	  match	  with	  societal	  values	  typical	  to	  the	  environment.	  
	  
Systemizing	  hybridity	  
If	  we	  take	  the	  trichotomy	  of	  environments	  as	  point	  of	  departure,	  anomalies	  through	  
hybridity	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  intermediary	  positions	  between	  two	  or	  three	  environments.	  
	  
An	  image	  may	  serve	  to	  illustrate	  this	  point:	  
	  
	   	  
	  
Against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  this	  image	  hybrids	  may	  be	  listed	  categorized	  both	  as	  ‘in	  between’	  
positions	  (1-­‐4),	  and	  as	  types	  of	  singular	  and	  multiple	  hybridity.	  The	  below	  table	  presents	  this	  
by	  way	  of	  listing	  hybrids,	  their	  hybrid	  characteristics,	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  hybridity	  and	  a	  
possible	  example.	  	  The	  list	  demonstrates	  the	  earlier	  point	  of	  singular	  hybridity	  being	  
multiple,	  so	  each	  case	  of	  a	  hybrid	  characteristic	  translates	  into	  two	  varieties	  as	  we	  assume	  
the	  one	  or	  the	  other	  coloring	  of	  the	  characteristic	  as	  congruent	  with	  other	  (mutually	  
consistent)	  characteristics:	  	  (this	  table	  only	  shows	  the	  design	  of	  the	  table	  –	  the	  full	  image	  
may	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  1;	  a	  partial	  selection	  in	  Appendix	  2)	  
	  
Spectrum	  of	  hybrid	  organizations	  
Hybrid	  in	  between	   Characteristics	   Nature	  of	  hybridity	   Examples	  ***	  
1.	  Hierarchy	  –	  Market	   Mission	  –	  Control	  –	  Response*	   Specification**	   ….	  X	  
2.	  Market	  –Network	  	   Ditto	   Ditto	   X	  
3.	  Network	  –	  Hierarchy	   Ditto	  	   Ditto	   X	  
4.	  All	   Ditto	   Ditto	   x	  
	   *	  singular	  &	  multiple	   **	   ***	  minus	  ‘doubles’	  :	  x	  
	  
Letters	  en	  numbers:	  
	  
H	  –	  Hierarchy	  
M	  –	  Market	  
N	  –	  Civil	  networks	  
1.	  	  	  –	  Hybrids	  H	  &	  M	  
2.	  	  	  –	  Hybrids	  M	  &	  N	  
3.	  	  	  –	  Hybrids	  N	  &	  H	  







This	  ‘analytical’	  classification	  can	  be	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  addressing	  if	  and	  how	  individual	  
hybrids	  can	  function	  adequately,	  despite	  of	  their	  disalignment	  with	  the	  environment	  
relevant	  to	  their	  role	  in	  allocating	  goods	  and/or	  services.	  	  
	  	  
As	  this	  immediately	  concerns	  the	  question	  how	  ‘contradictory	  public	  values	  can	  be	  properly	  
managed	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  good	  governance’,	  we	  need	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  (or	  the	  clearest	  possible	  
or	  a	  decidedly	  clear)	  understanding	  of	  what	   is	  meant	  by	   the	   terms	   ‘good	  governance’	  and	  
‘proper	  management’,	  and	  how	  they	  relate.	  So,	  we	  need	  to	  place	  the	  institutional	  approach	  
of	  this	  paper	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ‘governance	  and	  management’.	  
	  
8.	  Good	  Governance	  
In	  the	  perspective	  of	  this	  paper,	  Good	  Governance	  will	  involve	  (amongst	  others):	  	  
1. choosing	  the	  kind	  of	  institutional	  environment	  that	  receives	  the	  best	  general	  acceptance	  
(ex	   ante	   or	   ex	   post),	   suited	   (as	   ‘rules	   of	   the	   game’)	   to	   the	   allocation	   of	   particular	  
services.27	  
2. arranging	   for	   an	   organizational	   set-­‐up	   (as	   ‘rules	   of	   its	   game’)	   to	   achieve	   the	   best	  
alignment	   with	   its	   institutional	   environment,	   in	   its	   choice	   of	   mission,	   control	   and	  
response	  characteristics,	  given	  its	  possible	  role	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  the	  particular	  service	  
(as	  a	  societal	  interest).	  
	  
In	   short,	   governance	   is	   about	   the	   setting	   of	   rules	   of	   the	   game	   (as	   a	   verb,	   in	   introducing,	  
changing	  and	  terminating	  these;	  or	  as	  a	  noun,	  regarding	  a	  possible	  or	  given	  –	  constitutive	  –	  
state	  of	  affairs)	  concerning	  either	  institutional	  environments	  or	  organizations.28	  
The	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  are	  about	  (generally	  accepted)	  structures,	  mechanisms	  and	  processes	  
regarding	   (types	   of)	   human	   interactions	   patterns	   (e.g.	   bargaining,	   cooperating,	  
obliging/governing)	   and	   their	   impacts.29	   Patterns	   and	   rules	   concerning	   fair	   trade,	  
stakeholder	   participation	   and	   consumer	   contracts	   through	   Internet,	   are	   characteristic	  
examples.	   Institutionally,	  environments	  and	  organizations,	  not	  only	  manifest	  empirically	  as	  
patterns	   of	   behavior,	   but	   also	   normatively,	   as	   a	   set	   of	   a	   hitherto	   shared	   (i.e.	   broadly	  
accepted)	  regularities	  and	  rules	  (Ruiter,	  2004).	  	  
	  
As	   a	   concept	   ‘governance’	   stands	   apart	   from	   particular	   organizational	   entities,	   such	   as	  
government.	  Government	  is	  (but)	  a	  type	  of	  organization,	  which	  –	  in	  an	  ideal	  type	  approach	  –	  
specializes	   in	  hierarchical	  governance	  (i.e.	  applying	  hierarchical	  power	  over	  others	  who	  are	  
subordinate).	  Preferably,	   ‘to	  govern’	  and	   ‘governing’	  are	  taken	  to	  refer	  to	  exactly	  this	  type	  
of,	   hierarchical,	   governance	   –	   alongside	   ‘bargaining’	   and	   ‘cooperating’	   as	   competitive	   and	  
network	  modes	  of	  governance.	  	  
	  
9.	  Management	  
As	  governance	  is	  about	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game.	  These	  rules	  will	  allow	  an	  area	  of	  play	  within	  
each	  environment	  or	  organization.	  Management	  is	  about	  deciding	  on	  a	  game	  plan	  for	  the	  
play	  of	  the	  game,	  within	  given	  rules.	  It	  is	  guided	  by	  the	  question,	  which	  action	  possibilities	  
within	  this	  area	  of	  play	  best	  serve	  their	  interests	  and	  fit	  accompanying	  values.	  In	  short:	  other	  
than	  governance,	  management	  is	  about	  arranging	  activities	  within	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game.	  
Play	  of	  game	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  interactions	  within	  environments	  and	  within	  organizations.	  In	  
both	  regards	  decisions	  need	  be	  taken	  on	  a	  game	  plan,	  de-­‐	  and	  prescriptive	  of	  how	  relations	  
and	  processes	  are	  structured.	  Such	  structuring	  should	  make	  interactions	  (and	  related	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processes)	  optimally	  serve	  either	  value-­‐configurations	  (of	  environments;	  legitimacy,	  justice,	  
effectiveness	  and	  efficiency	  –	  geared	  to	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  allocation	  of	  goods	  and	  services)	  
or	  characteristics	  (of	  organizations;	  mission,	  control	  and	  response	  –	  geared	  to	  a	  given	  or	  
possible	  position	  in	  allocation	  of	  goods	  and	  services.	  
Such	  management	  can	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  structuring	  game	  play	  actions	  within	  environments	  or	  
organizations	  (across	  segments	  or	  units),	  but	  also	  of	  structuring	  relations	  and	  process	  
between	  environments	  and	  organizations.	  In	  doing	  so,	  management	  enables	  the	  actual	  play	  
of	  game:	  interactions	  and	  related	  processes	  of	  actual	  allocation	  (as	  the	  below	  table	  shows).	  
	  
Organization	  aligning	  to	  Institutional	  Environment	  
Governance→	   Management→	   Operations	  
Rules	  of	  the	  game	   Game	  plan	   Playing	  the	  game	  
Ground	  rules	  with	  societal	  acceptance	  or	  in	  
(some)	  alignment	  with	  environments	  
Choice	  of	  action	  possibilities	  
regarding	  relations	  and	  processess	  
Interactions	  and	  processes	  in	  practice	  
	  
Changes	  in	  governance	  may	  well	  bring	  different	  action	  possibilities	  for	  playing	  the	  game)	  and	  
thus	  lead	  to	  new	  management	  decisions	  (on	  a	  game	  plan).	  This,	  however,	  may	  also	  work	  the	  
other	  way	  around:	  the	  play	  of	  game	  and/or	  the	  choice	  of	  game	  plans	  may	  lead	  to	  make	  
changes	  in	  governance	  –	  e.g.	  fair	  trade	  rules	  being	  changed	  upon	  unwanted	  strategic	  
alliances,	  and/or	  practices	  of	  undesirable	  industrial	  cooperation.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  
concepts	  are	  distinct	  but	  their	  boundaries	  are	  reciprocally	  permeable.	  
	  
This	  is	  relevant	  especially	  from	  actor	  perspective.	  This	  perspective	  does	  not	  only	  consist	  of	  
players	  within	  a	  game,	  but	  also	  of	  (as	  they	  are	  named	  here)	  ‘principal	  parties’.	  These	  are	  the	  
organizations	  (or	  persons)	  that	  are	  primarily	  about	  governance	  of	  an	  environment	  (e.g.	  the	  
legislator	  introducing	  a	  health	  care	  market)	  or	  about	  governance	  of	  an	  organization	  (e.g.	  a	  
person	  or	  (organized)	  persons	  establishing	  a	  company).30	  Some	  of	  these	  a	  merely	  ‘founding	  
fathers’,	  and	  are	  ‘out	  of	  the	  picture’	  once	  the	  environment	  or	  organization	  is	  (properly)	  
established.	  Others	  remain	  relevant	  to	  (changes	  in)	  governance	  (or	  termination)	  –	  such	  as	  
the	  legislator	  having	  created	  a	  public	  allowances	  market,	  or	  the	  firm	  that	  has	  established	  a	  
new	  firm	  in	  which	  it	  retains	  a	  deciding	  say.	  New,	  additional,	  principal	  parties	  are	  often	  
introduced	  upon	  establishment	  of	  an	  environment	  or	  organization	  –	  such	  as	  regulators,	  
boards	  of	  CEO’s,	  and	  oversight	  bodies.	  	  
Principle	  parties’	  involvement	  may	  also	  extend	  into	  management	  of	  environments	  or	  
organizations,	  or	  issues	  in	  between	  governance	  and	  management	  (following	  the	  immediately	  
above	  ‘permeability	  thesis’).	  The	  related	  activities	  of	  principal	  parties	  may	  well	  (and	  often	  
do)	  differ	  from	  types	  of	  action	  possibilities	  available	  to	  (ordinary)	  players	  –	  such	  as	  when	  a	  
supervisor	  issues	  unilateral	  prohibitions	  onto	  reciprocal	  activities	  between	  players	  (as	  with	  
relevance	  to	  fair	  competition).31	  Hence	  there	  was	  room,	  under	  New	  Public	  Management,	  to	  
embark	  on	  experiments	  and	  changes	  involving	  that	  management	  of	  public	  sector	  
organizations	  was	  organized	  more	  alike	  business	  sector	  organization	  principles	  (Pollitt	  &	  
Bouckaert,	  2004).	  	  
	  
Within	  an	  organizational	  perspective,	  management	  is	  clearly	  a	  vital	  function;	  an	  organization	  
having	  to	  structure	  its	  in-­‐	  and	  external	  relations	  and	  work	  processes.	  To	  this	  end	  
organizations	  generally	  have	  their	  management	  function’	  attributed	  to	  specific	  persons	  or	  
units	  –	  such	  as	  the	  aforementioned	  board	  of	  CEOs.	  	  
Conversely,	  with	  regard	  to	  environments,	  the	  management	  function	  seems	  less	  clear	  (as	  it	  
does	  not	  pertain	  to	  a	  separate	  entity),	  but	  may	  be	  understood	  by	  actions	  of	  ‘principal	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parties’,	  such	  as	  oversight	  bodies,	  which	  are	  about	  making	  an	  environment	  work	  best	  (to	  
safeguard	  en	  enhance	  societal	  acceptance,	  also	  by	  making	  players	  flourish)	  –	  such	  as	  by	  
providing	  information,	  agreeing	  with	  players	  (through	  covenants)	  on	  use	  of	  an	  allowed	  area	  
of	  game	  play	  that	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  explored	  and	  thus	  brings	  undecided	  issues,	  and	  –	  of	  
course	  –	  by	  effectively	  and	  efficiently	  enforcing	  rules.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  these	  parties	  are	  
involved	  in	  management	  of	  the	  environment	  as	  such,	  but	  also	  of	  themselves	  (vis	  a	  vis	  
others),	  and	  given	  their	  nature	  as	  principal	  parties,	  sometimes	  both	  coincide.	  
	  
10.	  Good	  governance	  &	  Proper	  management	  
The	  above	  distinctions	  aim	  to	  attach	  operational	  meaning	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘Good	  Governance	  
in	  terms	  of	  properly	  managing	  contradictory	  public	  values’(see	  §	  1).	  	  
	  
Ideal	  type	  contradictions	  
Such	  operational	  meaning	  should	  first	  and	  foremost	  be	  fed	  into	  a	  recap	  on	  contradictory	  
values.	  The	  premise	  in	  above	  discussions	  is	  that	  there	  are	  no	  contradictory	  values	  within	  
ideal	  type	  institutional	  environments,	  nor	  within	  the	  related	  ideal	  type	  organizations.	  
Between	  the	  value-­‐configurations	  of	  different	  environments	  (categorized	  as	  legitimacy,	  
justice,	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency)	  and	  different	  organizations	  (manifest	  in	  personality,	  
mission,	  control	  and	  response),32	  there	  are	  no	  contradictions	  either	  –	  only	  individual	  values	  
may	  be	  contradictory	  in	  a	  one	  on	  one	  comparison.	  
	  
Consequently,	  the	  good	  governance	  and	  proper	  management	  challenge	  regarding	  	  
contradictory	  public	  values	  does	  not	  exist	  under	  ideal	  type	  circumstances.	  This	  state	  of	  
affairs	  also	  applies	  to	  public	  values	  involved	  in	  ideal	  type	  hierarchy	  and	  ideal	  type	  
government.	  
Of	  course,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  (applying)	  design	  in	  practice,	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  hierarchical	  
environment	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  government	  organizations	  will,	  under	  ideal	  type	  
aspirations,	  require	  that	  adequate	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  are	  set	  and	  if	  necessary	  adjusted	  (as	  a	  
matter	  of	  good	  governance)	  and	  that	  (as	  a	  matter	  of	  proper	  management)	  adequate	  game	  
plans	  are	  in	  place	  and	  if	  necessary	  adjusted	  to	  ensures	  that	  game	  play	  is	  structured	  to	  
optimally	  apply	  given	  rules	  of	  the	  game.	  Essentially,	  however,	  these	  are	  issues	  of	  governance	  
and	  management	  about	  avoiding	  internal	  contradictions.	  	  
	  
Hybrid	  organizations;	  hybrid	  environments	  
The	  possibility	  of	  hybrid	  organizations,	  with	  key	  characteristics	  inconsistent	  with	  ideal	  type	  
alignment	  to	  a	  particular	  environment,	  faces	  us	  with	  the	  possibility	  that	  contradictory	  values	  
do	  manifest	  and	  disrupt.	  In	  the	  above	  the	  argument	  was	  made	  that	  such	  anomalies	  may	  
pose	  a	  threat	  to	  both	  the	  organization	  itself	  (facing	  the	  need	  to	  reconcile	  singular	  or	  multiple	  
hybridity	  to	  enable	  a	  consistent	  management	  game	  plan	  towards	  game	  play),	  but	  also	  to	  the	  
environment	  (facing	  a	  challenge	  to	  its	  key	  value-­‐configuration,	  posing	  a	  threat	  to	  societal	  
acceptance	  of	  typical	  interactions	  and	  allocative	  outcomes).	  
	  
Taken	  from	  the	  ideal	  type	  point	  of	  departure,	  a	  consistent	  governance	  &	  management	  
response	  to	  remedy	  such	  a	  hybrid	  state	  of	  anomaly	  is	  possible	  only	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  hybrid	  
institutional	  environment.	  	  
Hybrid	  environments,	  with	  similar	  intermediary	  positions	  (between	  hierarchy,	  networks	  and	  
markets)	  as	  shown	  for	  hybrid	  organizations,	  could	  facilitate	  acknowledgement	  of	  hybrid	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organizations	  (by	  hybrid	  alignment)	  and	  be	  underpinned	  by	  societal	  acceptance	  of	  the	  
involved	  (types	  of)	  interactions	  and	  resulting	  allocation.	  	  
Both	  acceptance	  and	  alignment	  will	  demand	  that,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  principle	  parties	  create	  
and	  safeguard	  necessary	  conditions	  under	  which	  a	  hybrid	  environment	  is	  considered	  an	  
attractive	  mode	  of	  governance	  and	  hybrid	  organizations	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  align	  
successfully.	  Societal	  acceptance	  will	  especially	  reflect	  upon	  shifts	  in	  existing	  value-­‐
configurations,	  across	  their	  categories	  –	  legitimacy,	  justice,	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency.	  For	  
example,	  input	  legitimacy	  (e.g.	  public	  participation)	  and/or	  distributive	  justice	  (i.e.	  equality	  
between	  private	  individuals)	  may	  become	  less	  important	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  
effectiveness	  and	  efficiency	  (as	  output	  legitimacy).	  
	  
These	  are	  the	  kinds	  of	  shifts	  that	  are	  clearly	  recognizable	  in	  many	  countries.	  	  
Liberalization	  of	  public	  services	  may	  often	  be	  promoted	  as	  an	  ideal	  type	  shift	  from	  hierarchy	  
to	  competition,	  but	  effectively,	  the	  desire	  to	  retain	  public	  values	  (such	  as	  equal	  access)	  lead	  
to	  a	  ‘half-­‐way	  settlement’,	  as	  a	  regulated	  form	  of	  competitive	  allocation	  of	  services.	  
Dependent	  on	  the	  arrangement	  in	  case,	  perhaps	  existing	  ideal	  type	  commercial	  enterprise	  
PSO´s	  can	  plurally	  align	  (see	  §	  6),	  but	  a	  regulated	  hybrid	  service	  market	  may	  also	  come	  with	  
constraints	  which	  only	  allow	  PSO’s	  which	  have	  effectively	  embraced	  hybridity	  in	  their	  key	  
characteristics	  (mission,	  control	  or	  response)	  in	  ways	  that	  serve	  public	  values.	  
Autonomization	  in	  rendering	  public	  services,	  may	  manifest	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  quango’s	  
which	  replace	  democratic	  control	  by	  professional	  management.	  A	  further	  step	  is	  to	  include	  
civil	  society	  (network)	  organizations	  within	  such	  (participative)	  quangos,	  and	  yet	  one	  more	  
step	  is	  to	  allow	  such	  network	  organizations	  to	  have	  (limited)	  public	  authority	  (e.g.	  
subsidizing).	  Thus	  intermediary	  regulated	  hybrid	  environments	  may	  be	  created	  (in	  this	  case	  
on	  the	  hierarchy-­‐network	  axis),	  especially	  geared	  to	  accommodate	  hybrid	  organizations	  –	  
which	  would	  combine	  network	  and	  hierarchy	  characteristics	  (amounting	  to	  singular	  or	  plural	  
hybridity).	  Of	  course,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  key	  public	  values	  in	  network	  interactions,	  safeguarded	  
by	  adoption	  in	  key	  organization	  characteristics	  will	  be	  a	  core	  regulatory	  element.	  
The	  Managerial	  Revolution	  (Chandler,	  1977)	  could	  provide	  yet	  another	  example	  which,	  
however,	  is	  left	  out	  as	  it	  is	  (mostly)	  relevant	  to	  intermediary	  positions	  on	  the	  market-­‐
network	  axis	  and	  not	  of	  immediate33	  relevance	  to	  the	  contradictory	  public	  value	  issue.	  
Public	  Private	  Partnerships	  (PPP)	  could	  be	  considered	  an	  interesting	  hybrid	  category,	  
primarily	  on	  the	  hierarchy-­‐market	  and	  hierarchy-­‐network	  axis	  (and,	  only	  with	  indirect	  
relevance	  to	  public	  values,	  on	  the	  network-­‐market	  axis	  –	  especially	  when	  corporate	  social	  
responsibility	  meets	  NGO	  involvement).	  It	  is	  feasible	  that	  for	  such	  PPP	  arrangements	  hybrid	  
environments	  are	  introduced.34	  Theoretically	  these	  may	  even	  include	  a	  regime	  for	  
superhybrids,	  which	  combine	  all	  ideal	  type	  hierarchy,	  network	  and	  market	  characteristics	  –	  
although	  such	  a	  term	  readily	  suggests	  a	  form	  of	  ‘singularity’	  (of	  unlimited	  ability	  and	  
permission)	  only	  known	  to	  absolute	  monarchs.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  more	  analytical	  terms	  of	  our	  above	  analysis	  of	  hybridity,	  we	  could,	  alternatively,	  
isolate	  forms	  of	  hierarchy	  related	  hybridity.	  This	  would	  lead	  to	  hybrids	  on	  the	  axis	  of	  
‘hierarchy	  and	  market’	  (such	  as	  in	  liberalization),	  	  of	  ‘hierarchy	  and	  network’	  (such	  as	  in	  
autonomization),	  as	  well	  as	  ‘hierarchy	  and	  market	  and	  network’	  (such	  as	  PPP).	  If	  we	  list	  
these	  options	  (see	  appendix	  2)	  then	  we	  find	  nine	  possible	  hybrids	  (three	  singular	  and	  six	  
multiple)	  for	  the	  first	  two	  categories	  of	  hybrids	  and	  seven	  hybrids	  (one	  unlikely	  singular	  six	  




Clearly,	  these	  hybrids	  combine	  values	  characteristic	  of	  different	  ideal	  type	  environments	  and	  
corresponding	  ideal	  type	  organizations,	  with	  some	  values	  clashing.	  On	  a	  technical	  point,	  one	  
may	  ask	  if	  the	  clash	  is	  between	  contradictory	  public	  values,	  as	  some	  evidently	  originate	  in	  
other	  ideal	  type	  environments	  and	  fit	  with	  corresponding	  organizations	  (without	  being	  
shared	  –	  see	  §	  6).	  This	  could	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  even	  in	  hybrid	  settings	  (of	  environments	  
and	  organizations)	  there	  are	  no	  contradictory	  public	  values,	  only	  ‘alien’	  contradictory	  values	  
of	  a	  different	  ideal	  type	  kind.	  	  
The	  view	  is	  taken	  here,	  however,	  in	  keeping	  with	  remarks	  in	  §	  2	  (connecting	  values	  to	  
interests;	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  former	  following	  that	  of	  the	  latter),	  that	  in	  as	  much	  as	  hybrid	  
environments	  and	  organizations	  function	  and	  operate	  in	  service	  of	  public	  interests	  (albeit	  
sometimes	  of	  a	  meta-­‐public	  kind),	  the	  acceptance	  of	  values	  relevant	  to	  that	  interest	  makes	  
these	  values	  public	  values	  –	  and	  not	  only	  when	  public	  authority	  is	  involved.35	  If	  functional	  
relevance	  within	  the	  hybrid	  to	  the	  public	  interest	  remains	  contested,	  than	  this	  is	  a	  clear	  sign	  
that	  substantive	  contradictions	  are	  prohibitive	  to	  a	  properly	  functioning	  hybrid	  environment	  
and/or	  organization;	  the	  ‘alien	  value’	  cannot	  be	  adopted,	  or	  more	  precisely,	  be	  understood	  
as	  coherently	  functional	  to	  the	  public	  interest.	  
Further,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  below,	  hybrid	  hierarchy	  brings	  ad	  hoc	  public	  (especially	  
administrative)	  law	  arrangements	  in	  which	  the	  (meta-­‐)public	  interest	  is	  addressed	  as	  a	  
matter	  of	  properly	  arranging	  and	  safeguarding	  all	  relevant	  values.	  If,	  for	  instance,	  values	  
connected	  to	  contracting	  would	  be	  such	  a	  relevant	  value,	  by	  their	  functional	  nature	  those	  
would	  be	  a	  public	  values	  (too).	  As	  such,	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  contradictory	  public	  values	  
would	  be	  at	  hand,	  such	  as	  if	  contracting	  were	  to	  replace	  an	  unilateral	  legal	  acts,	  if	  
dependency	  on	  suppliers’	  services	  would	  be	  compensated	  by	  fair	  trade	  (safeguarding	  the	  
exit	  option’)	  and	  the	  duty	  of	  service	  under	  equal	  access	  rules.	  
	  
Comments	  
This	  approach	  and	  the	  accompanying	  examples	  trigger	  three	  important	  comments.	  
	  
Firstly,	  the	  possibility	  of	  hybrid	  environments	  follows	  from	  the	  above	  mentioned	  non-­‐
contradictoriness	  (on	  configuration	  level),	  but	  must	  come	  with	  awareness	  that	  individual	  
values	  may	  clash	  contradictorily.	  Such	  clashes	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  no	  go	  areas	  in	  terms	  of	  
possibility	  or	  desirability	  of	  creating	  hybrid	  environments	  with	  accompanying	  hybrid	  
organizations	  (in	  as	  much	  as	  their	  key	  characteristics	  go).	  	  
When	  contradictory	  values	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  the	  ability	  (inter)act	  coherently	  (e.g.	  
competing	  and	  cooperating)	  or	  to	  provide	  coherent	  normative	  evaluation	  (e.g.	  some	  acts	  
being,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  both	  prohibited	  and	  permitted),	  good	  governance	  nor	  proper	  
management	  –	  whether	  of	  environments	  or	  of	  organizations	  –	  no	  longer	  seem	  feasible.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  the	  examples	  show	  the	  possibility	  of	  regulated	  hybrid	  environments.	  Western	  
societies	  have,	  over	  the	  last	  20	  years	  (as	  the	  above	  ‘examples’	  showed),	  seen	  a	  strong	  
increase	  of	  such	  hybrid	  arrangements	  –	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  shift	  from	  government	  to	  
governance.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  ideal	  type	  realm	  of	  hierarchy	  and	  government,	  under	  the	  rule	  
of	  general	  (constitutional	  and	  especially)	  administrative	  law,	  new	  hybrid	  regimes	  have	  been	  
introduced.	  Each	  of	  these	  holds	  a	  particular	  (ad	  hoc)	  scope,	  either	  dedicated	  to	  specific	  
organizational	  types	  of	  quasi-­‐government	  organizations	  (e.g.	  quango’s	  and	  government	  
enterprises	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  traditional	  public	  office),	  or	  dedicated	  to	  specific	  public	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service	  types	  (e.g.	  energy,	  health	  care	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  general	  executive	  effort).	  As	  these	  
arrangements	  adopt	  only	  those	  elements	  of	  general	  (constitutional	  and)	  administrative	  
provide	  that	  are	  coherent	  with	  hybrid	  organization	  and/or	  public	  service	  types,	  they	  lead	  to	  
a	  (ad	  hoc)	  fragmentation	  of	  administrative	  law	  –	  with	  only	  some	  norms,	  instruments	  and	  
remedies	  being	  applicable,	  and	  often	  with	  a	  more	  particular	  meaning	  or	  limited	  scope	  (Levi-­‐
Faur	  &	  Benish;	  2011)	  	  	  
Fragmentation	  of	  administrative	  law	  is	  testimony	  to	  seeking	  and	  achieving	  ad	  hoc	  societal	  
acceptance.	  Such	  achievement	  involves	  debate	  on	  shifts	  in	  configurations	  of	  legitimacy,	  
justice,	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency	  values	  –	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  good	  governance	  convictions	  –	  
and	  of	  proper	  organization	  alignment	  –	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  attuning	  key	  characteristics	  –	  debates	  
which	  may	  be	  protracted,	  also	  as	  in	  practice	  changes	  may	  take	  time	  to	  fine	  tune.	  
Furthermore,	  increasing	  fragmentation	  may	  cause	  a	  normative	  strain,	  when	  societal	  
opinions	  find	  it	  hard	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  need	  for	  having	  made	  or	  making	  yet	  again	  an	  
exception	  to	  ideal	  type	  arrangements.36	  
	  
Thirdly,	  the	  possibility	  of	  hybrid	  environment	  –	  hybrid	  organization	  matches	  is,	  again,	  both	  a	  
governance	  and	  management	  challenge,	  as	  it	  affects	  both	  the	  setting	  of	  rules	  (of	  the	  
environment,	  with	  societal	  acceptance,	  and	  of	  the	  organization,	  in	  hybrid	  alignment).	  As	  a	  
matter	  of	  proper	  design,	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  flesh	  out	  all	  involved	  and	  interconnected	  
four	  areas	  of	  governance	  and	  management,	  with	  focus	  on	  hybrids	  which	  especially	  relate	  to	  
contradictory	  public	  values	  –	  an	  effort	  which	  will	  not	  be	  undertaken	  here.	  
	  
4	  categories	  of	  good	  governance	  and	  proper	  management	  
Rules/play↓	   IE/OE→	   Institutional	  Environment	  (IE)	   Organizational	  entity	  (OE)	  
Governance	   	  1.	  Gov-­‐of-­‐IE	   2.	  Gov-­‐of-­‐OE	  
Management	   3.	  Man-­‐of-­‐IE	   4.	  Man-­‐of-­‐OE	  
Interest	  as	  measure	  of	  success	  →	   Societal	  interests	  in	  allocation	   Organizational	  interest	  in	  allocation	  
	   →	  societal	  acceptance	  	  	   →	  alignment	  with	  IE	  	  
	  
Needless	  to	  say,	  finally,	  that	  the	  chosen	  approach	  does	  not	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  ‘free	  
radicals’:	  hybrid	  organizations	  without	  a	  proper	  alignment	  in	  a	  hybrid	  environment.	  The	  
premise	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  that	  such	  radicals	  will	  occasionally	  (and	  often	  accidentally)	  come	  into	  
existence	  but	  as	  a	  rule	  they	  will	  either	  fail	  (as	  the	  mutant	  natural	  organism	  that	  cannot	  
survive	  in	  any	  habitat),	  or	  find	  that	  through	  an	  adaptation	  in	  the	  environment	  (possibly	  in	  




This	  paper	  is	  mostly	  an	  attempt	  to	  provide	  a	  framework	  within	  which	  the	  challenge	  of	  ‘good	  
governance	  as	  proper	  management	  of	  contradictory	  public	  values’,	  becomes	  an	  issue	  that	  
can	  usefully	  be	  addressed	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  design	  of	  PSO’s,	  especially	  of	  a	  hybrid	  kind.	  Much	  
was	  done,	  often	  still	  in	  a	  lapidary	  way,	  to	  clarify	  notions	  (such	  as	  values,	  interests,	  
contradictoriness,	  governance,	  management,	  alignment,	  hybridity),	  as	  otherwise	  the	  mere	  
thought	  of	  design	  (as	  resting	  upon	  a	  methodological	  foundation)	  becomes	  an	  illusion.	  
	  
In	  conclusion	  the	  further	  design	  challenge	  lies,	  firstly,	  in	  understanding	  the	  challenges	  of	  
societal	  acceptance	  of	  institutional	  environments	  and	  the	  alignment	  of	  organizations.	  
Secondly,	  we	  need	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  there	  is	  hybridity	  beyond	  ideal	  type	  analysis.	  Thirdly,	  
we	  need	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  contradictory	  (public)	  values	  requires	  an	  intricate	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mixed	  governance	  and	  management	  approach,	  across	  the	  scope	  of	  environments	  and	  
organizations	  involved.	  
	  
Clearly,	  this	  paper’s	  particular	  take	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  contradictory	  public	  values	  and	  hybrid	  
PSO’s	  is	  a	  mere	  first	  step	  towards	  a	  true	  design	  method.	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  in	  need	  of	  
thorough	  criticism.	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An	  overview	  of	  hybrid	  organizations	  
(Due	  to	  illness	  the	  column	  with	  examples	  could	  not	  be	  completed	  before	  the	  paper	  deadline)	  
	  
Spectrum	  of	  hybrid	  organizations	  
Hybrid	  in	  between	   Characteristics*	   Nature	  of	  hybridity**	   Examples	  ***	  
	  
1.	  Hierarchy	  –	  Market	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   publ.task	  &	  private	  profit	   1a.	  Gambling	  by	  government	  
publ.task	  &	  private	  profit	   1b.	  Permitting	  by	  business	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   publ.auth.	  &	  investors	   2a.	  Corporatist	  government	  
publ.auth.	  &	  investors	   2b.	  State	  owned	  enterprise	  	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   publ.good	  &	  comp.advantage	   3a.	  Competing	  regulators	  
publ.good	  &	  comp.advantage	   3b.	  Corporate	  social	  resp.	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   publ.task	  &	  investors	   4a.	  (=	  5d)	  	  
publ.task	  &	  investors	   4b.	  (=	  6b)	  	  
private	  profit	  &	  publ.auth.	   4c.	  (=	  5b)	  	  
private	  profit	  &	  pub.auth.	   4d.	  (=	  6d)	  	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  –	  Response	   publ.auth.	  &	  comp.advantage	   5a.	  (=	  6a)	  	  
publ.auth.	  &	  comp.advantage	   5b.	  =	  4c	  
investors	  &	  pub.good	   5c.	  (=	  6c)	  	  
investors	  &	  pub.good	   5d.	  =	  4a	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  –	  Response	   publ.task	  &	  comp.adv’ge	   6a.	  =	  5a	  
publ.task	  &	  comp.adv’ge	   6b.	  =	  4b	  
private	  profit	  &	  publ.good	   6c.	  =	  5c	  
private	  profit	  &	  publ.good	   6d.	  =	  4d	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   only	  under	  4.	   -­‐	  
	  
2.	  Market	  –Network	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   private	  profit	  &	  comm.service	   7a.	  (=	  xx)	  	  
private	  profit	  &	  comm.service	   7b.	  	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   investors	  &	  professionals	   8a.	  
Investors	  &	  professionals	   8b.	  	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   comp.adv’ge	  &	  members	  resp.	   9a.	  
comp.adv’ge	  &	  members	  resp.	   9b.	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   private	  profit	  &	  professionals	   10a.	  
private	  profit	  &	  professionals	   10b.	  
comm.service	  &	  investors	   10c.	  
comm.service	  &	  investors	   10d.	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  –	  Response	   investors	  &	  members	  resp.	   11a.	  
investors	  &	  members	  resp.	   11b.	  =	  	  
professionals	  &	  comp.adv’ge	   11c.	  =	  8c	  
professionals	  &	  comp.adv’ge	   11d.	  =	  10a	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  –	  Response	   private	  profit	  &	  members	  resp.	   12a.	  
private	  profit	  &	  members	  resp.	   12b.	  	  
comm.service	  &	  comp.adv’ge	   12c.	  
comm.service	  &	  comp.adv’ge	   12d.	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   only	  under	  4.	   -­‐	  
	  
3.	  Network	  –	  Hierarchy	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   comm.service	  &	  publ.task	   13a.	  
comm.service	  &	  publ.task	   13b.	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   professionals	  &	  publ.auth	   13c.	  
professionals	  &	  publ.auth	   13d.	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   members	  resp.	  &	  publ.good	   14a.	  
members	  resp.	  &	  publ.good	   14b.	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   comm.service	  &publ.auth.	   15a.	  
comm.service	  &	  publ.auth.	   15b.	  
publ.task	  &	  professionals	   15c.	  
publ.task	  &	  professionals	   15d.	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  –	  Response	   professionals	  &	  publ.good	   16a.	  
professionals	  &	  publ.good	   16b.	  
publ.auth.	  &	  members	  resp.	   16c.	  
publ.auth.	  &	  members	  resp.	   16d.	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  –	  Response	   comm.service	  &	  publ.good	   17a.	  
comm.service	  &	  publ.good	   17b.	  
publ.task	  &	  members	  resp.	   17c.	  
publ.task	  &	  members	  resp.	   17d.	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   Only	  under	  4.	   	  
	  
4.	  Al	  





l	   publ.task	  &	  priv.profit	  &	  
comm..service	  
18b	  
publ.task	  &	  priv.profit	  &	  
comm..service	  
18c	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   publ.auth	  &	  investors	  &	  
professionals	  
19a	  
publ.auth	  &	  investors	  &	  
professionals	  
19b	  
publ.auth	  &	  investors	  &	  
professionals	  
19c	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   publ.good	  &	  comp.adv’ge	  &	  
members	  resp.	  
20a.	  
publ.good	  &	  comp.adv’ge	  &	  
members	  resp.	  
20b.	  
publ.good	  &	  comp.adv’ge	  &	  
members	  resp.	  
20c.	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   Only	  1-­‐3	   -­‐	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  –	  Response	   Only	  1-­‐3	   -­‐	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  –	  Response	   Only	  1-­‐3	   -­‐	  
Mission	  -­‐	  Control	  -­‐	  Response	   publ.task	  &	  investors	  &	  
members	  resp.	  
21a.	  
publ.task	  &	  professionals	  &	  
comp.adv’ge	  
21b.	  
priv.profit	  &	  publ.auth.	  &	  
members	  resp.	  
21c.	  
priv	  profit	  &	  professionals	  &	  
publ.good	  
21d.	  
comm.serv.	  &	  publ.auth.&	  
comp.adv’ge	  
21e.	  
comm.serv.	  &	  investors	  &	  
publ.good	  
21f.	  
*	  Singular	  hybridity	  in	  yellow,	  only	  one	  position	  with	  each	  variety;	  multiple	  hybridity	  in	  green,	  two	  or	  three	  positions	  per	  variety	  
**	  in	  singular	  hybridity,	  the	  term	  colored	  blue	  is	  assumed	  consistent	  with	  the	  other	  characteristics;	  in	  multiple	  hybridity	  (but	  not	  triple),	  
the	  characteristic	  colored	  blue	  is	  assumed	  consistent	  with	  the	  characteristic	  that	  does	  not	  as	  such	  partake	  in	  hybridity	  	  	  
***	  instead	  of	  names,	  which	  are	  sometimes	  cryptic	  and	  interchangeable,	  often	  functions/activities	  are	  listed	  
	  





Three	  types	  of	  hybrids	  involving	  hierarchy	  
	  	  
1.	  Hierarchy	  &	  Market,	  meaning	  that	  on	  counts	  of	  mission,	  control	  or	  response	  the	  
organization,	  yields	  nine	  possible	  hybrids;	  three	  singular	  and	  six	  multiple.	  	  	  
	  
1.	  Hierarchy	  &	  Market	  
Mission	   Control	   Response	  	  
Public	  task	  &	  Private	  profit	   Public	  authority	   Public	  good	  
Public	  task	   Public	  authority	  &	  Investors	   Public	  good	  
Public	  task	   Public	  authority	   Public	  good	  &	  Competition	  
	  
Public	  task	   Investors	   Competition	  
Public	  task	   Public	  authority	   Competition	  
Private	  profit	   Public	  authority	   Competition	  
Private	  profit	   Public	  authority	   Public	  good	  
Private	  profit	   Investors	   Public	  good	  
Public	  task	   Investors	   Public	  good	  
	  
2.	  Hierarchy	  &	  Network,	  meaning	  that	  on	  counts	  of	  mission,	  control	  or	  response	  the	  
organization,	  again	  yields	  nine	  possible	  hybrids;	  three	  singular	  and	  six	  multiple.	  
	  
2.	  Hierarchy	  &	  Network	  
Mission	   Control	   Response	  	  
Public	  task	  &	  Community	  service	   Public	  authority	   Public	  good	  
Public	  task	   Public	  authority	  &	  Professionals	   Public	  good	  
Public	  task	   Public	  authority	   Public	  good	  &	  Members	  
	  
Public	  task	   Professionals	   Members	  
Public	  task	   Public	  authority	   Members	  
Community	  service	   Public	  authority	   Members	  
Community	  service	   Public	  authority	   Public	  good	  
Community	  service	   Professionals	   Public	  good	  
Public	  task	   Professionals	   Public	  good	  
	  
3.	  Hierarchy	  &	  Market	  &	  Networks,	  meaning	  that	  on	  counts	  of	  mission,	  control	  or	  response,	  
one,	  singular	  hybrid	  appears	  as	  a	  likely	  organizational	  monstrosity,	  and	  six	  multiple	  hybrids	  in	  
which	  two	  out	  of	  three	  characteristics	  reflect	  market	  and	  network	  organization	  
characteristics.	  	  
	  
3.	  Hierarchy	  &	  Market	  &	  Network	  
Mission	   Control	   Response	  	  
Public	  task	  &	  private	  profit	  &	  community	  
service	  
Public	  Authority	  &	  	  investors	  &	  professions	   Public	  good	  &	  members	  &	  competition	  
	  
Public	  task	   Investors	   Members	  
Public	  task	   Professionals	   Competition	  
Private	  profit	   Public	  authority	   Members	  
Community	  service	   Public	  authority	   Competition	  
Community	  service	   Investors	   Public	  good	  
Private	  profit	   Professionals	   Public	  good	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  	  Vide:	  http://www.utwente.nl/mb/legs/staff/heldeweg/.	  
2	  Inter-­‐esse,	  to	  ‘be	  between’,	  depicts	  the	  notion	  of	  personification;	  an	  interest	  relates	  to	  a	  persons	  benefit	  (of	  use)	  to	  a	  situation,	  asset	  etc.	  
2	  Inter-­‐esse,	  to	  ‘be	  between’,	  depicts	  the	  notion	  of	  personification;	  an	  interest	  relates	  to	  a	  persons	  benefit	  (of	  use)	  to	  a	  situation,	  asset	  etc.	  
considering	  his	  or	  her	  needs.	  This	  need	  or	  interest	  can	  of	  course	  also	  be	  voiced,	  by	  a	  person	  who	  himself	  does	  not	  share	  in	  the	  need	  or	  
25	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
interest	  –	  altruism	  is	  not	  excluded.	  The	  term	  ‘perception’	  is	  used	  to	  express	  that	  an	  interest	  may	  be	  a	  misapprehension	  –	  e.g.	  when	  a	  upon	  
further	  scrutiny	  or	  experience	  it	  would	  turn	  out	  that	  a	  certain	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  in	  fact	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  a	  personal	  need	  –	  but	  
nonetheless	  something	  that	  is	  acted	  upon	  (guided	  by	  related	  values).	  The	  objects	  of	  these	  perceptions	  are	  thought	  to	  possess	  or	  come	  with	  
a	  capacity	  or	  potential	  to	  meet	  needs.	  
3	  This	  ‘functional	  approach’	  of	  the	  value-­‐interest	  relationship	  does	  include	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  regressus	  ad	  infinitum,	  as	  a	  person	  may	  have	  
an	  interest	  in	  upholding	  certain	  values,	  which	  may	  in	  turn	  be	  valued	  positively	  or	  negatively	  by	  others	  etc.	  	  I	  do	  not	  consider	  this	  as	  a	  
problem,	  but	  it	  emphasizes	  the	  need	  for	  clear	  and	  substantive	  reference	  (which	  interests	  or	  values).	  
4	  As	  even	  when	  an	  interest	  merely	  concerns	  almost	  all	  (i.e.	  is	  shared	  by	  almost	  all)	  clearly	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  interest	  to	  all	  and	  moreover	  in	  
using	  ‘society’	  over	  ‘all’	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  future	  members	  of	  society	  (and	  perhaps	  past)	  are	  also	  included.	  	  
5	  	  I	  accept	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  society	  as	  a	  community	  is	  a	  fiction,	  but	  regard	  it	  as	  a	  useful	  fiction	  –	  just	  as	  legal	  persons	  are	  useful	  legal	  
fictions	  –	  to	  facilitate	  solutions	  to	  free	  rider/collective	  action	  and	  negative	  externality	  problems.	  	  
6	  It	  will	  depend	  on	  legal-­‐political	  doctrines	  whether	  public	  interests	  remain	  societal	  interests	  (also	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  private	  initiative	  and	  
action	  –	  as	  in	  the	  ‘liberal	  state),	  or	  whether	  they	  are	  exclusively	  public	  (only	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  government	  –	  as	  in	  collective/communist	  
states).	  The	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘also’	  expresses	  a	  bias	  to	  the	  liberal	  state	  perspective.	  
7	  Allocation	  primarily	  only	  concerns	  ‘who	  gets	  what	  against	  which	  price’,	  but	  may	  –	  through	  the	  definition	  of	  ‘what	  –	  also	  extend	  to	  
dedicated	  quality	  considerations	  (e.g.	  punctuality	  of	  trains).	  Non-­‐dedicated	  quality	  considerations,	  such	  as	  environmental	  standards,	  which	  
also	  regard	  (activities	  regarding)	  a	  particular	  public	  service	  (e.g.	  emission	  standards	  for	  vehicles)	  are	  not	  included	  and	  refer	  to	  other	  public	  
interests	  (e.g.	  the	  environment).	  	  
8	  Other	  concerns	  of	  societal	  infrastructures	  may	  be,	  amongst	  possible	  others,	  physical	  (roads,	  dikes,	  communication	  and	  energy	  grids)	  or	  
organizational	  (army,	  civil	  services).	  
9	  To	  protect	  and	  improve	  the	  workings	  of	  institutional	  environments,	  as	  an	  interest	  of	  an	  abstract	  nature,	  transcending	  applicability	  or	  
indeed	  functionality	  to	  a	  particular	  right/claim,	  good	  or	  service	  (as	  a	  specific	  societal	  interest).	  See	  the	  example	  in	  the	  main	  text.	  
10	  Taken	  separately,	  but	  also	  from	  the	  perspective	  that	  liberal	  society	  rests	  upon	  a	  proper	  balance	  between	  different	  environments	  and	  
that	  for	  their	  existence	  (proper	  to	  society)	  environments	  depend	  on	  interactions	  within	  other	  environments.	  
11	  	  The	  above	  (in	  main	  text)	  examples	  fit,	  as	  does	  the	  example	  where	  a	  special	  regulatory	  arrangement	  is	  created	  to	  ensure	  better	  and	  fair	  
competition	  in	  national	  health	  care,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  health	  care	  as	  a	  public	  interest,	  but	  without	  necessarily	  amounting	  to	  greater	  
government	  involvement.	  	  
12	  	  ‘Generally’	  is	  to	  say,	  relevant	  to	  all	  members	  of	  the	  community	  involved;	  ‘abstractly’	  is	  to	  say	  in	  every	  (new)	  case	  in	  which	  they	  can	  be	  
relevant.	  	  	  
13	  	  I	  believe	  a	  functional	  approach,	  embedded	  within	  relations	  and	  interactions	  between	  persons/organizations,	  is	  useful	  as	  inevitably	  
values	  need	  to	  reflect	  on	  if	  and	  how	  persons/organizations	  act	  or	  position	  themselves	  within	  these	  relations	  and	  interactions.	  
14	  	  ‘Can’	  must	  be	  understood	  in	  normative	  terms:	  of	  some	  (legal)	  person	  possessing	  an	  authoritative	  or	  generally	  accepted	  power	  to	  act	  on	  
behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  interest	  (‘what’)	  
15	  	  I	  assume	  that	  institutional	  environments	  too,	  can	  and	  do	  change,	  such	  as	  the	  history	  of	  government	  hierarchy	  as	  an	  institutional	  
environment	  has	  shown	  –	  in	  the	  ‘West’	  particularly	  through	  democratization	  and	  the	  divide	  between	  dominium	  and	  imperium.	  Similarly	  
values	  relating	  to	  markets	  change,	  such	  as	  through	  new	  rules	  on	  competition	  or	  new	  legal	  forms.	  	  	  
16	  	  These	  examples	  are	  purely	  meant	  to	  illustrate	  and	  serve	  the	  general	  understanding	  of	  the	  concept,	  not	  to	  provide	  a	  prelude	  to	  a	  
rigorous	  selection.	  
17	  Including	  government	  operating	  non	  other	  then	  with	  concern	  for	  its	  utensils	  (buying.	  Leasing	  or	  renting	  land,	  buildings,	  equipment	  etc.).	  
18	  Exclusive	  bestowment	  suggests	  ‘imperium-­‐based’	  or	  ‘statutory’	  power	  (bestowed	  by	  constitution	  or	  lower	  legislation).	  Outside	  such	  
realm	  often	  governments	  hold	  (sometimes	  exclusive)	  property	  rights	  (in	  land,	  in	  other	  immovable	  goods,	  but	  also	  in	  movable	  goods,	  
including	  (treasury)	  funds)	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  government	  may	  introduce	  prohibitions	  and	  commands,	  or	  grant	  permissions,	  subsidies,	  
and	  payment	  for	  contractual	  services	  (e.g.	  relevant	  to	  realizing	  public	  works),	  all	  of	  which	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  ‘dominium-­‐‘	  or	  ‘property-­‐
based’.	  
19	  Private	  interests	  and	  values	  also	  exist	  for	  natural	  persons,	  but	  these	  will	  not	  be	  discussed	  here.	  
20	  	  Certainly	  since	  the	  ‘rise’	  of	  neo	  institutional	  economics	  (e.g.	  Coase,	  North,	  Williamson	  -­‐	  pm),	  it	  is	  generally	  accepted	  that	  to	  exist	  or	  
flourish	  markets	  require	  government	  facilitation	  (whether	  that	  be	  through	  legislative	  administrative	  or	  judiciary	  interventions)	  –	  especially	  
to	  secure	  trust	  between	  parties	  within	  the	  market.	  
21	  	  The	  term	  ‘meta’	  I	  propose	  to	  use	  when	  government	  is	  not	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  (the	  allocation	  of)	  a	  particular	  good	  or	  service,	  but	  in	  
general	  and	  abstractly	  with	  an	  allocation	  mechanism	  as	  such	  and	  as	  we	  can	  recognize	  in	  the	  institutional	  environments	  of	  markets,	  
networks	  and	  government	  hierarchy.	  	  
22	  This	  image	  of	  levels	  of	  social	  action	  is	  taken	  from	  Williamson	  (2000),	  and	  adapted	  to	  consider	  organizations	  as	  governance	  structures,	  
which	  mediate	  between	  individual/discrete	  transactions	  and	  institutional	  environments.	  Organizations	  are	  at	  a	  lower	  level	  also	  because	  in	  
this	  paper	  they	  are	  considered	  distinct	  from	  networks	  (let	  alone	  environments),	  as	  organizations	  are	  seen	  as	  entities	  with	  the	  capacity	  for	  
decision-­‐making	  on	  internal	  and	  external	  activities,	  suitable	  for	  legal	  personality	  (which	  environments	  are	  clearly	  not).	  
23	  	  A	  tempting	  first	  comment	  as	  to	  what	  comes	  first:	  existence	  (personality)	  or	  essence	  (mission).	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  for	  private	  persons	  
(e.g.	  individuals,	  companies)	  the	  Sartrian	  adage	  applies:	  ‘Existence	  precedes	  essence’	  (‘L’existence	  precede	  l’essence’)	  because/so	  that	  
‘Men	  are	  free’	  (‘Que	  l’humain	  est	  libre’),	  whereas	  for	  public	  persons	  (e.g.	  governments)	  the	  opposite	  applies:	  first	  there	  is	  a	  public	  interest	  
that	  is	  considered	  in	  need	  of	  government	  attention,	  then	  a	  public	  office	  is	  established	  and	  assigned	  to	  it	  and	  it	  is	  not	  free	  to	  entertain	  in	  
other	  interests.	  	  
24	  	  Judgments	  upon	  evaluation,	  such	  as	  ‘good’	  or	  ‘bad’	  will,	  broadly	  speaking,	  move	  across	  the	  spectrum	  of:	  ‘positive	  to	  both	  societal	  and	  
players	  interests’	  -­‐	  ‘positive	  to	  societal	  interests,	  without	  detriment	  to	  players	  interests	  (or	  with	  proper	  compensation)’	  -­‐	  ‘positive	  to	  
players	  interests,	  without	  detriment	  to	  societal	  interests	  (or	  with	  proper	  compensation)’	  –	  ‘positive	  to	  societal	  interests,	  with	  detriment	  to	  
players	  interests	  (without	  proper	  compensation)’	  -­‐	  ‘positive	  to	  players	  interests,	  with	  detriment	  to	  societal	  interests	  (without	  proper	  
compensation)’	  -­‐	  ‘detrimental	  to	  both	  societal	  and	  players	  interests’.	  	  
25	  	  Empirical	  facts	  are	  state	  of	  affairs	  ultimately	  observable	  by	  human	  senses	  (if	  necessary	  after	  theorizing,	  modeling	  and	  experimenting);	  
with	  propositions	  concerning	  these	  facts	  being	  either	  true	  or	  untrue	  (I	  am	  born	  on	  the	  Moon).	  Institutional	  facts	  are	  states	  of	  affairs	  which	  
are	  only	  indirectly	  observable,	  through	  interpretation	  of	  empirical	  facts,	  with	  reference	  to	  social	  beliefs,	  norms	  and/or	  conventions;	  with	  
proposition	  concerning	  these	  facts	  being	  either	  valid	  or	  not/invalid	  (I	  am	  owner	  of	  this	  horse).	  	  
26	  Compare	  this	  with	  ‘asset	  specificity’	  of	  certain	  transactions	  (Williamson,	  1975).	  
26	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  In	  a	  liberal	  state	  one	  may	  assume	  markets	  and	  civil	  society	  are	  –	  spontaneous	  –	  default	  options	  for	  allocation	  and	  government	  is	  (always	  
checking	  on	  failure	  –	  meta-­‐public	  –	  and	  can	  be)	  a	  alternative	  in	  case	  of	  severe	  failure.	  
28	  	  One	  may	  argue	  that	  separating	  these	  two	  is	  sensible	  only	  in	  relative	  terms,	  as	  organizations	  necessarily	  operate	  in	  an	  environment,	  but	  
may	  also	  themselves	  be	  institutional	  environments	  to	  institutional	  social	  subsystems	  within	  this	  organization.	  From	  a	  legal	  perspective	  we	  
may	  use	  legal	  personality	  to	  conclude	  that	  some	  organizations	  can	  be	  legal	  persons,	  whereas	  institutional	  environments	  (such	  as	  a	  market)	  
cannot.	  See	  endnote	  22.	  
29	  	  These	  structures,	  processes	  and	  mechanisms	  manifest	  as	  interactions/behavior	  as	  well	  as	  through	  the	  existence	  of	  ‘signs’	  (such	  as	  
documented	  rules)	  and	  technical	  functions	  (such	  as	  housing,	  modi	  operandi	  and	  communication	  facilities),	  which	  are	  not	  themselves	  
human	  interaction/behavior	  patterns,	  but	  are	  about	  such	  patterns	  (e.g.	  underpinning,	  enabling,	  validating	  etc.).	  In	  other	  words,	  ‘rules	  of	  
the	  game’	  may	  be	  formal	  and	  informal,	  written	  and	  unwritten,	  explicit	  and	  implicit	  etc.	  As	  such	  they	  involve	  both	  empirical/descriptive	  and	  
institutional/normative	  information	  –	  see	  below	  in	  the	  main	  text.	  	  
30	  We	  should	  consider	  that	  (theoretically)	  there	  may	  be	  institutional	  environments	  that	  exist	  merely	  by	  the	  grace	  of	  an	  invisible	  hand,	  as	  a	  
spontaneous	  process	  of	  interacting	  players	  –	  active	  in	  bargaining	  or	  cooperating.	  Generally,	  however,	  such	  systems	  are	  short	  lived,	  unless	  
they	  come	  up	  with	  organizations,	  which	  are	  about	  upholding	  the	  systems	  workings.	  
31	  Principal	  parties	  stand	  separate	  from	  (mere)	  ‘players’:	  the	  organizations	  that	  play	  the	  game	  (1)	  inside	  the	  system,	  (2)	  according	  to	  the	  
given	  rules,	  and	  (3)	  only	  to	  their	  self-­‐interest.	  Principle	  parties,	  however,	  are	  organizations	  whose	  interests	  (not	  their	  organizational	  rules	  of	  
the	  game)	  align,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  dedication,	  with	  the	  institutional	  environment	  or	  (other)	  organization.	  
32	  The	  possibility	  exists	  that	  on	  other,	  minor,	  organization	  characteristics	  contradictions	  do	  manifest.	  In	  this	  paper	  we	  take	  the	  assumption	  
that	  such	  anomalies	  do	  not	  affect	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  dominant	  key	  characteristics	  (mission,	  control,	  response).	  These	  minor	  issues	  may	  be	  
a	  management	  tool	  to	  or	  challenge	  in	  specific	  cases,	  but	  should	  not	  distract	  us	  from	  the	  basic	  form.	  	  	  
33	  Should	  a	  shift	  form	  investor	  to	  manager	  control	  lead	  to	  improved	  interaction	  and	  allocation,	  then	  -­‐perhaps-­‐	  this	  could	  overcome	  market	  
failure	  on	  societal	  values	  and	  thus	  the	  need	  for	  government	  involvement.	  	  
34	  Heldeweg	  &	  Sanders	  (2011)	  emphasize	  the	  possibility	  to	  treat	  PPPs	  as	  ideal	  type	  organizations,	  as	  PPP-­‐characteristics	  will	  often	  show	  a	  
consistent	  variation	  in	  mission,	  control	  and	  response,	  allowing	  to	  categorize	  them	  as	  ‘public	  authority	  aligning	  with	  hierarchy’	  
(Authoritative-­‐PPP),	  as	  ‘strategic	  cooperation	  aligning	  with	  networks’	  (Network-­‐PPP),	  or	  as	  ‘efficient	  bargaining	  aligning	  with	  markets’	  
(Market-­‐PPP).	  Such	  organizations	  may	  carry	  ‘amphibian’	  traits	  (of	  plural	  alignment);	  hybridity	  is	  considered	  problematic	  (but	  not	  
elaborated	  upon	  from	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  hybrid	  environment	  perspective).	  	  
35	  Which	  could	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  narrow	  view	  on	  adopting	  ‘alien’	  values	  –	  taking	  ‘control’	  as	  the	  critical	  factor	  (“Who	  owns	  the	  office	  –	  and	  for	  
whom?	  Perrow,	  1983	  (cited	  also	  in	  De	  Ridder,	  2011:	  14)).	  	  
36	  For	  instance	  recognizable	  in	  a	  public	  call	  on	  parliament	  to	  redress	  matters	  of	  CEO	  salaries	  in	  hybrid	  markets,	  when	  in	  fact	  the	  legislator	  
has	  excluded	  parliamentary	  control	  over	  this	  issue	  (as	  one	  for	  the	  labor	  market).	  
